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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, TlUstees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea TlUSt uldlt 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California corporation; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARAVE, indIvidually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR, 
ALTERNATIVELY, MOTIONft9~~EW TRIAL - I 
~vt... 
I ~~.J 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attomeys of record, the 
law finn of Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, Idaho Falls, Idaho, and move the 
Comi for its Order of Judgment for the Defendant notwithstanding the verdict in this 
case, pursuant to LR.C.P. 50(b) or, altematively, for a new trial pursuant to LR.C.P. 
59(a)(6). 
In suppOli of this Motion, the Plaintiffs contend and allege as follows: 
1. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of High 
Mark Development, LLC on the issue of breach of contract I breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
2. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of High 
Mark Development, LLC on the issue of fraud. 
3. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of High 
Mark Development, LLC on the issue of fraud by nondisclosure. 
4. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of 
Gordon Arave on the issue of fraud by nondisclosure. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter judgment 
in their favor on these grounds, notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, or altematively, 
for a new trial. In support of this Motion, Plaintiffs submit their Brief in Support of 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Altematively, for New Trial. 
Plaintiffs hereby request the opportunity to file briefing and present oral 
argument in a hearing before the court. 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR, 
AL TERNATIVEL Y, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 2 
.. ') <) r'" 
1. ... }.) 0 
Furthermore, this Motion has the effect of tolling the requirement for 
Plaintiffs to respond to the Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees, and 
likewise the Court's detennination thereof. 
Plaintiffs hereby request the opportunity to file briefing and present oral 
argument in a hearing before the court. 
DA TED this 22 nd day of March, 2010. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR, 
AL TERNATIVEL Y, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 2010. 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Sean 1. Coletti, ISBN 7199 
428 Park Avenue 
P. O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Telephone: 208-523-4445 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust uldlt 
DATED NOVEMBER 2,1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California corporation; 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, indIvidually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR NEW TRIAL - 1 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, the law 
firm of Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, Idaho Falls, Idaho, and 
submit this Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, 
alternatively, for a new trial pursuant to l.R.C.P. 50(b) & 59(a)(6). 
INTRODUCTION 
In December of2009, this Court decided that High Mark Development, 
LLC breached its contract with the Plaintiffs to provide truthful infonnation in an 
Estoppel Certificate. The remaining question was whether this breach caused damages to 
the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that causation was shown at the trial. 
Furthermore, there seemed to be no dispute at trial that, at the very least, 
the Estoppel Celiificate and the Income and Expense Statement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 
and 20) contained false information and were sent to Plaintiffs by High Mark. Plaintiffs 
again assert that the evidence supported a finding that High Mark committed fraud by 
making these statements. Furthermore, the evidence also supported a verdict that the 
nondisclosure of the November 2007 Promissory Note by High Mark constituted fraud. 
Rule 50(b) requires there by "substantial evidence" of "sufficient quantity 
and probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was 
proper" in order for a Court to uphold the verdict on a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 567, 97 P.3d 428 (2004). 
Since such "substantial evidence" regarding these claims did not exist at trial, the Court 
should grant Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR NEW TRIAL - 2 
If the Court neveliheless deems that the verdict did not support the 
evidence, or that substantial justice would be served in vacating the verdict, Plaintiffs 
alternatively request that the Court grant their Motion for a New Trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
shall be served not later than fOUIieen days after entry of the 
judgment[.] ... If a verdict was returned the court may allow 
the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either 
order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment. 
l.R.C.P.50(b). 
When ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
("judgment n.o.v."), the COUIi "is to review the record and draw all inferences from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and detennine whether 
substantial evidence exists to justify submitting the case to the jury." Karlson v. Harris, 
140 Idaho 561, 567,97 P.3d 428 (2004). "The determination of whether evidence before 
the COUIi is sufficient to create an issue of fact is a question of law." Id. "For evidence 
to be considered substantial the evidence must 'be of such sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict of the jury was 
proper. '" Id. (citing Manny v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194 
(1974). "'The question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the party 
against whom the motion is made, but whether there is substantial evidence upon which 
the jury could properly find a verdict for that pmiy. '" Id. (quoting Pocatello Auto Color, 
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Inc. v. Akzo Coatings Inc., 127 Idaho 41, 45,896 P.2d 949 (1995). "Upon a motion for 
judgment n.o.v., the moving party admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every 
inference that may be legitimately drawn therefrom." Id. 
2. Motion for new trial. 
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on al1 or part of the issues in an action for any of the 
following reasons: ... 6. Insufficiency of the evidence to 
justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against the 
law. Any motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth 
the factual grounds therefor with particularity. 
I.R.C.P.59(a)(6). 
"A trial judge may grant a new trial based on LR.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where 
'after he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of the credibility 
of the witnesses, he concludes that the verdict is not in accord with his assessment of the 
clear weight of the evidence." Karlson, 140 Idaho at 568 (citing Quick v. Crane, III 
Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d I] 87 (1986). "The trial court is given broad discretion in this 
lUling." Id. "The trial judge may set aside the verdict even though there is substantial 
evidence to support it." Id. "In addition, the trial judge is not required to view the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict-winner." Id. "The trial court may grant 
a new trial when it is satisfied the verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the 
evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by vacating it, or when the 
verdict is not in accord with either law or justice." Id. (citing Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 
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665,671,429 P.2d 397 (1967). Furthermore, "'[i]fhaving given full respect to the jury's 
findings, the judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a new trial. '" [d. 
(citing Quick, III Idaho at 768). 
ARGUMENT 
1. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of 
High Mark Development, LLC on Plaintiffs' claim of Breach of Contract. 
Even assuming that all the adverse evidence were tme, as Rule 50(b) 
requires us to do, there was not substantial evidence to support the jury verdict that High 
Mark Development, LLC's actions and inactions did not proximately cause damages to 
the Plaintiffs by their breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
This Court had previously decided in its Memorandum Decision and Order 
all Motions/or Summmy Judgment that certain statements made by High Mark in the 
Estoppel Certificate were false: 
The tenant and High Mark had previously modified 
and/or altered the Lease as to make arrangements for unpaid 
rent and collected the "deferred" rent payments at a later date 
pursuant to promissory notes. Furthermore, the evidence 
establishes that not "all minimum monthly rent has been 
paid". Rent owed to High Mark in fact remained unpaid. 
Mem. Dec. and Order, p. 8. 
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As to the Plaintiffs' claims for Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing, and Breach of Contract, the Court previously decided that "The presentation of 
the false and misleading statements constituted a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and therefore was a breach of the agreement." Id. at 9. Regarding 
the claims of breach, the COUIt determined, however, that "issues of fact exist as to 
whether information other than the Estoppel Certificate was provided to Plaintiffs, and 
whether the inaccurate infonnation in the Certificate proximately caused Plaintiffs' 
alleged damages." Id. at 10. The issue was "what information was actually received by 
the Plaintitls, not what information the Plaintiffs could have discovered through their 
own investigation." Id. at 10, n.1. 
At the trial, this issue played out as follows. Tom O'Shea and the other 
Plaintiffs testified that they were indeed damaged by the false statements made in the 
Estoppel Celiificate. These damages were also made evident by the testimony of Jefl 
Needs, Brent Butikofer, and David Smith. The amount of these damages was separately 
detennined by David Smith as either lost profits ($801,594 at 12% interest) or loss of 
value ($1,363,648 at 12% interest), and by Brent Butikofer as lost value at $1,492,040. 
The question of causation came down to whether the Plaintiffs received 
information from High Mark that would have informed them of the false nature of the 
statements in the Estoppel Certificate. At the jury instmction conference, the Court asked 
counsel for the Defendants what evidence had been shown that the Plaintiffs had ever 
seen the August 28, 2007 Balance Sheet. Defendants' answer was that the jury could 
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"draw the inference" that it had been received, notwithstanding the fact that none of the 
Plaintiffs saw it, Jeff Needs stated he never saw it, and Paul Fife never saw it. Even if 
Plaintiffs had seen this Balance Sheet, however, there is no issue that this document did 
not contain any information about the non-payment of rent. 
Paul Fife's deposition was also read into evidence. Fife testified that he did 
tell leffNeeds about the release of a promissory note as consideration for the tenant 
signing the Estoppel Certificate. Deposition o/Paul F~re, p. 49, 1. 23 - p. 51,1. 24. 
However, Fife stated that he did not know what the promissory note was all about, did 
not have any indication it was for nonpayment of rent or rent deferral, and did not 
communicate anything of its nature to leffNeeds. Jd., p. 51,1. 25 p. 52, l. 7. 
Defendants argued that Plaintiffs' Exhibit 52 (discussing updated CAM 
charges) should have informed the Plaintiffs of the inaccuracies in the Estoppel 
Celiificate, as it stated, "We will work out the deficit balances with the Children's Center 
on the Cam Charges through 2007." However, Gordon Arave testified that the deficit 
was due to the fact that High Mark had received, in November 2007, notice of a new tax 
assessment for the taxes due in 2007; which are billed in arrears and were to be prorated 
at closing. See Plaint!fls' Exhibit 53. Again, the issue was whether Plaintiffs had been 
informed of (a) Promissory Notes altering the Lease Agreement by making rent 
concessions, or (b) nonpayment of rent by The Children's Center. The updated CAM 
charges exhibit did not infonn the Plaintiffs of the truth of either of these matters and any 
deficit was the responsibility of High Mark as part of the closing. 
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The evidence clearly demonstrates that other documents actually received 
and reviewed by the Plaintiffs indicated that The Children's Center had been paying 
substantial rent. The Lease Agreement stated that the rent amount was $24,987.50. 
Although not the basis for a fraud claim, the LoopNet ad stated that the "Schedule Gross 
Income" and "Net Operating Income" were $299,850, or 12 months of rent. The Income 
and Expense Statement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14, p. 4, and Plaintiffs' Exhibit 20), received 
twice by the Plaintiffs, stated that rent received from 6/2006 through 7/2007 was 
$324,836.00, or approximately 13 months' rent. The tax returns (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 16) 
showed substantial rents being paid for 2005 ($255,632) and 2006 ($478,866), and 
similarly showed a growing business with gross receipts totaling $4,205,948 in 2005 and 
increasing to $5,771,602 in 2006. Although a loss was shown for 2006, the Profit and 
Loss Statement (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14, p. 6) only showed a loss of$10,820.70 for the first 
six months of2007, and the Plaintiffs testified that they understood The Children's 
Center as being a growing, thriving business. 
"Substantial evidence" did not exist to show that the two false statements 
from the Estoppel Certificate were ever clarified by other information received by the 
Plaintiffs. Nothing informed the Plaintiffs that the Center had not paid rent. The 
Plaintiffs testified that had they known that rent had not been paid or promissory notes 
had been signed for the nonpayment of rent, they would not have purchased the propeliy. 
Furthermore, according to the law of the case established at Summary Judgment, the 
questions of whether the Plaintiffs should have met face to face with Gordon Arave or 
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Matt Smith, or sought out any other information regarding The Children's Center were 
not relevant to the issue of breach of contract damages. 
The jury had to determine two questions on breach of contract: (a) whether 
Plaintiffs were damaged on account of the breach, and (b) the amount of the damages. 
Even considering all of the evidence in a light most favorable to Defendant High Mark, 
"substantial evidence" did not support the jury verdict for the High Mark on the claims of 
breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This 
Court should enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of breach of 
contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as against High Mark. 
2. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of 
High :l\1ark Development, LLC on Plaintiffs' claim of Fraud. 
The jury was also asked whether High Mark committed fraud, which was a 
proximate cause of the damages to the Plaintiffs. Based upon the above discussion 
concerning breach of contract, and the Court's Instruction No. 33, substantial evidence 
did not exist to support the verdict in favor of Defendant High Mark on the issue of fraud. 
The evidence instead supported findings that Defendant High Mark stated a 
fact to the Plainti ff (element 1), the statement was false (element 2), the statement was 
material (element 3), the Plaintiff did not know that the statement was false (element 5), 
the Plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement, and the Plaintiff suffered damages, 
the nature and extent of which were explained at trial (element 10). 
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Regarding the other elements of fraud, the evidence supported Plaintiffs' 
position that High Mark knew the statements in the Estoppel Certificate regarding the 
payment of rent were false (element 4). Rent was supposed to be paid to High Mark, yet 
both a manager and a member of High Mark signed an April 2007 Promissory Note for 
unpaid rent. Scott Williams, the bookkeeper and rent collector for High Mark did not 
testify, yet it was evident from the testimony of Matt Smith and Marc Weinpel that he 
knew that The Children's Center had not paid rent for several months. Both Smith and 
Weinpel testified as to High Mark's review of The Children's Center's books after 
several months of unpaid rent, and also regarding a meeting between Smith, Weinpel and 
Williams concerning the Center's inability to pay rent. FUlihennore, substantial evidence 
showed that Richard Armstrong, an agent of High Mark, contributed to and participated 
in the drafting of the various estoppel celiificates containing false information concerning 
rent. 
High Mark intended that the Plaintiffs rely upon the statements made in the 
Estoppel and act upon them in a manner reasonably contemplated (element 6). Evidence 
was presented that it was the obligation of High Mark, not The Children's Center, to 
provide an Estoppel Celiificate to the Plaintiffs. That Certificate (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 25) 
was made to "certify to the O'Shea Family Trust" certain information, including rent 
payment, and concluded as follows: 
This certification is made with the knowledge that it 
will be relied upon by Purchaser, Purchaser's lender and any 
successor or assignee of Purchaser's right to purchase the 
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Property in connection with financing and sales of the 
Property and the purchase of the Property by Purchaser. 
As previously stated by the Court, "The tenant was not under any 
obligation to Plaintiffs to provide the Certificate. Instead, it was High Mark's obligation 
to provide the Certificate as a condition precedent to proceeding with its closing .... It 
was ... not a viable option for High Mark to meet its contractual obligation to provide a 
Celiificate by providing a Certificate with false infOlmation." Mem. Dec. and Order, pp. 
7,9. 
The questions of reasonable reliance (element 8) and proximate cause 
(element 9) are likewise comlected to whether other information was provided to the 
Plaintiffs that would have shown the statements in the Estoppel Certificate to be false. 
Crucial to this determination was the jury instruction that stated that it was "not a defense 
to fraud that Plaintiffs could have, by independent investigation, ascertained the truth 
from other sources." Jwy Inst. No. 37. With this understanding of the law, it was clear 
that Plaintiffs relied upon the truth of the statements in the Estoppel Certificate. Their 
reliance was reasonable and justified because no other information was provided to the 
Plaintiffs which contradicted (a) that the Lease had not been altered or amended by the 
giving of a promissory note for unpaid rent, and (b) that all rent had been paid. 
Furthermore, it was uncontroverted at trial that the Plaintiffs would not have purchased 
the propeliy had they known the truth about the non-payment of rent or the promissory 
notes for rent deferral. 
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Again, substantial evidence supporting the verdict for Defendant High 
Mark on the issue of fraud was sorely lacking. The evidence instead showed that High 
Mark, through its agents, committed fraud by sUbmitting a false Estoppel Certificate to 
the Plaintiffs which induced the purchase of the property_ For all the same reasons, the 
evidence also supported a finding of fraud by High Mark as to the inaccurate Income and 
Expense Statements (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 14 and 20) which were submitted on behalf of 
High Mark. 
Plaintiffs request a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of 
fraud as against High Mark. 
3. Substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of 
High lVlark Development, LLC on Plaintiffs' claim of Fraud by Nondisclosure. 
Substantial evidence likewise did not exist to support the verdict on favor 
of High Mark on the issue of fraud by nondisclosure. Jury Instruction No. 34 instructed 
that a duty to disclose existed if "a fact known by one party and not the other is a vital 
fact upon which the bargain is based." The evidence showed that High Mark, through its 
agents, knew that rent was not paid by the Center for October, November and December 
2007, right before closing. High Mark's agent(s) knew that yet another promissory note 
was executed for unpaid rent for October and November 2007. At trial, each Plaintiff 
testified that had they known the Center did not pay rent for these months, they would not 
have closed on the property. This evidence was undisputed. Hence, High Mark had a 
duty under the law to disclose this note. 
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The elements of fraud by nondisclosure were likewise satisfied. High Mark 
was in possession of a vital fact, namely, the existence of the promissory note for October 
and November 2007 rent (element 1). High Mark did not ever disclose this fact to the 
Plaintiffs (element 2). This nondisclosure was material, as the Plaintiffs would not have 
closed had they known of this note (element 3). Plaintiffs clearly did not know about this 
note before closing (element 4). 
Regarding High Mark's knowledge that the Plaintiffs did not know about 
the November 2007 note (element 5), the evidence supported a finding that High Mark 
intended to keep the note secret. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29 is an email from Richard 
Armstrong to Marc Weinpel, which clearly denoted High Mark's knowledge that rent had 
not been paid for October and November 2007 and would be satisfied by a deferred rent 
note. Key to this email is the subject line, "Rent Obligation-Confidential and 
Privileged Settlement Negotiations pursuant to Idaho R. Evid. 408." (emphasis added). 
Clearly, High Mark did not want anyone to see the Note and corresponding email other 
than those associated with High Mark or the Center. I Gordon Arave testified that he did 
not tell the Plaintiffs about this note and that, in retrospect, it probably would have been a 
good thing to do. Benjamin and Jared Arave testified that they, likewise, did not infonn 
the Plaintiffs. Had Richard Armstrong testified, he also would have stated that he did not 
tell the Plaintiffs about this Note. See Statelnent of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial 
I It should also be noted that Mr. Armstrong's email was not attempting to compromise a claim which was "disputed 
as to either validity or amount." As such, I.R.E. 408 did not apply to protect Mr. Armstrong's communication. 
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Summm}' Judgment, p. 18. Paul Fife testified that he did not have any information that 
rent had not been paid by the Center for the months of October, November, or December 
2007, and that he did not communicate said nonpayment to the buyers. Deposition of 
Palll F(le, p. 54, 11. 8-21. 
The elements of reasonable reliance and proximate cause are connected to 
the infollnation received by the Plaintiffs, which the evidence showed did not infolln 
Plaintiffs of the truth regarding the nonpayment of rent. Furthermore, it cannot be 
disputed that Plaintiffs suffered damages by this nondisclosure. The Center never paid 
any rent or CAM charges to Plaintiffs under the Lease and vacated the premises before 
March 1, 2008. 
As substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict for High Mark on 
the claim of fraudulent nondisclosure, this Court should enter a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict for the Plaintiffs on this claim. 
4. Substantial evidence did not sUPRort the jury verdict in favor of 
Gordon Arave on Plaintiffs' claim of Fraud by Nondisclosure. 
Substantial evidence was lacking to support the jury's verdict in favor of 
Gordon Arave as to the claim of fraud by nondisclosure. Although this Court has 
previously stated that Gordon Arave could not be held liable for fraud merely because of 
his office in High Mark, nevertheless it was clear at the trial that Gordon Arave was the 
individual in charge at High Mark. He is one of two managers for High Mark (Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1). He warranted to Paul Fife that all infollnation provided by High Mark would 
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be true and correct (Plaintiffs Exhibit 2), while at virtually the same time telling Fife that 
the Center "had always paid on time." Deposition of Paul Fife, p. 29, 1. 21 p. 30,1. 5. 
He signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement on behalf of High Mark, promising to 
produce an Estoppel Certificate that this Court has determined had to be truthful 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5). 
Yet Gordon Arave did nothing to inform the Plaintiffs of vital facts in his 
possession regarding The Children's Center. Mr. Arave knew the following vital facts: 
(1) The Children's Center did not pay rent from September 2006 through February 2007, 
(2) The,Children's Center signed a prornissory note on April 18,2007 for the unpaid rent, 
(3) The Children's Center did not pay rent for October and November 2007, (4) The 
Children's Center signed a promissory note on November 7,2007 for the unpaid rent. 
Anyone or each of these facts was vital to the bargain, and therefore Mr. Arave had a 
duty to disclose these facts before or in conjunction with the closing. 
The evidence further disclosed that none of these facts were ever actually 
disclosed to the Plaintiffs. Gordon Arave admitted at trial that he did not tell Paul Fife 
that the April 18, 2007 note that was released was for unpaid rent. Paul Fife confirmed 
this fact at trial. Deposition 0.( Paul Fife, p. 51, 1. 25 p. 52, L 7. Consistent with the 
listing agreement on which Gordon Arave promised to provide true and correct 
infonnation, Paul Fife testified that he never had any reason to question the accuracy of 
the information being provided by Gordon. Id., p. 55,11. 8-25. The evidence supported a 
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finding that Gordon Arave knew that the Plaintiffs did not know that The Children's 
Center had satisfied unpaid rent by the signing of a promissory note in April of 2007. 
Gordon Arave likewise knew about the unpaid rent in October and 
November 2007. At trial, he feigned some ignorance by stating he was "traveling" 
during that time, but he did not deny his know ledge of the nonpayment of rent. He even 
acknowledged that infol111ing the Plaintiffs of the existence of the November 2007 note 
may have been the right thing to do. 
Instruction No. 38 stated that "to be held liable [for fraud committed by the 
entity], a manager or officer must specifically direct, actively participate in, or knowingly 
acquiesce in the fraud or other wrongdoing of the company or its managers or officers." 
The evidence at trial showed that Gordon Arave, at the very least, knowingly acquiesced 
in these nondisclosures, which he knew to be material and vital concerning nonpayment 
of rent. Again, Plaintiffs' reliance was reasonable and justified, and their damages were 
proximately caused by the nondisclosure. 
As substantial evidence did not support the jury verdict in favor of 
Defendant Gordon Arave on the issue of fraud by nondisclosure, this Court should enter 
its judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this issue and as it relates to Gordon Arave. 
5. Plaintiffs' Motions toll the time for responding to or deciding the 
Defendants' Motion for Attorney Fees. 
Plaintiffs note that on March 19,2010, the Defendants filed a Verified 
Memoralldum o{Costs and Attorneys' Fees in this case. Plaintiffs'MotionjorJudgment 
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Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Alternatively, for New Trial tolls the time for any 
response to the Defendants' Motion, or for a decision to be made by this Court on their 
Motion. The Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Alternatively, for 
New Trial tolls the time for an appeal from the challenged judgment: 
I.A.R. 14(a). 
The time for an appeal from any civil judgment, order 
or decree in an action is tenninated by the filing of a timely 
motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, 
conclusions of law or any judgment in the action[.] 
Since a "judgment" under I.R.c.P. 54(a) is defined as "a decree and any 
order from which an appeallies[,]" and the finality of the Court's judgment has been 
suspended for purposes of its appealability, it is no longer a 'judgment" for purposes of 
the Rule 54(e) time limit for filing or objecting to a memorandum of costs and fees. See 
J.P. Stravens Planning Assoc., fnc. v. Wallace, 129 Idaho 542, 546-47, 928 P.2d 46 (Ct. 
App. 1996). This conclusion "recognizes the practicality that there is little benefit in 
requiring the prevailing patiy to file its memorandum of costs within fourteen days from 
entry of judgment if there is pending a motion that may result in a different judgment in 
which a different party may prevail." ld. 
Although rVallace dealt specifically with a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or 
amend, its analysis applies equally to motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
under I.R.C.P. 50(b) or motions for new trial under LR.C.P. 59(a). Ultimately, this Court 
should not hear or determine the matter of fees or costs until after Plaintiffs' Motions 
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have been decided, as a different outcome and judgment could be rendered by this Court 
pursuant to the Plaintiffs' pending motions. 
CONCLUSION 
Even considering all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
Defendants mentioned in this Brief, substantial evidence did not support the verdict on 
these grounds. For the aforementioned reasons, Plaintiffs request that this Court grant 
their Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict on one, several or all of the 
grounds listed. In the alternative, since the verdict is not supported by the evidence, 
Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their Motion for a New Trial. 
DATED this 22 nd day of March, 2010. 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPE;~P~LC , 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and correct 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 22 nd day of March, 2010. 
Richard 1. Armstrong, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
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WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard J. Armstrong, ISBN 5548 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. CV-08-4025 
Judge Joel E. Tingey 
Defendants High Mark Development, LLC and Gordon Arave, by and through the 
undersigned counsel, hereby submit the following memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, alternatively, for a new trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is governed by Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 50(b). In determining a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court (1) 
reviews the record and draws all inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
non-moving party and (2) determines "whether substantial evidence exists to justifY submitting 
the case to thejury." See Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,567,97 P.3d 428,434 (2004) (citing 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 769, 890 P.2d 714, 720 (1995)). See also Quick v. Crane, 111 
Idaho 759, 766, 727 P.2d 1187, 1194 (1986) (stating trial court has no discretion to grant a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict; duty is to assess "whether there is sufficient evidence to 
raise a jury issue"). 
"By substantial, it is not meant that the evidence need be uncontradicted. All that 
is required is that the evidence be of such sufficient quantity and probative value 
that reasonable minds could conclude that the verdict ofthe jury was proper. It is 
not necessary that the evidence be of such quantity or quality that reasonable 
minds must conclude, only that they could conclude." 
VFP VC v. Dakota Company, 141 Idaho 326, 335, 109 P.3d 714, 723 (2005) (quoting Mann v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974)) (Emphasis added). "This 
inquiry focuses the court's attention to the evidence admitted in the case, and the court reviews 
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the facts with deference to the nonmoving party." Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 
(2009) (emphasis added). 
In a motion under Rule 50(b), Plaintiffs admit the truth of the adverse evidence 
and every inference that may be legitimately drawn therefrom. See Karlson, 140 Idaho at 567, 97 
P.3d at 434. In ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and determining the 
sufficiency ofthe evidence, the Court "'does not examine any conflicting evidence presented by 
the moving party to refute'" the other side's case. Karlson, at 567, 97 P.3d at 434 (quoting 
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 P.2d 429,431 (1981) (emphasis added)). 
B. Motion for a New Trial 
Plaintiffs have alternatively moved for a new trial, claiming insufficiency of the 
evidence. Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a) governs motions for a new trial. That rule states, in pertinent 
part, that "[ a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues 
in an action for any of the following reasons: ... (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against the law." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). "Any 
motion based on subdivision[] 6 ... must set forth the factual grounds therefor with 
particularity." See Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7). 
The trial court may only grant a new trial "'when it is satisfied the verdict is not 
supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is convinced the verdict is not in accord with the 
clear weight of the evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by vacating it, or 
when the verdict is not in accord with either law or justice.'" Karlson, at 568,97 P.3d at 435 
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(quoting Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 671, 429 P.2d 397, 403 (1967)). "The judge must also 
conclude that a different result would follow a retrial." Hudelson v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 142 
Idaho 244,248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs are seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and, alternatively, a 
new trial, on their breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing claims, as well as their fraud and fraud by non-disclosure claims as they relate to 
Defendants High Mark Development, LLC and Gordon Arave. Plaintiffs do not challenge the 
jury's verdict as it relates to Defendant Gordon Arave on the question of actual fraud. Plaintiffs 
also do not challenge the jury's verdict as it relates to Defendant Benjamin Arave, or this Court's 
directed verdict in favor of Jared Arave. 
In sum, Plaintiffs' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new 
trial relate solely to questions 1,2,3, and 6 of the jury's Verdict Form. 
In question 1, the jury answered "No" to the question "Did High Mark 
Development LLC's breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract 
as to the Purchase Agreement and estoppel certificate proximately cause damages to Plaintiffs?" 
In question 2, the jury answered "No" to the question "Did High Mark 
Development commit fraud, which was a proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs?" 
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In question 3, the jury answered "No" to the question "Did High Mark 
Development commit fraud by nondisclosure, which was a proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs?" 
In question 6, the jury answered "No" to the question "Did Gordon Arave commit 
fraud by nondisclosure, which was a proximate cause of damages to Plaintiffs?" 
As shown below, substantial evidence supported the jury's answers to each of 
these questions. 
I. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY TO 
CONCLUDE HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT DID NOT PROXIMATELY 
CAUSE PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF 
CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
A. The Law 
The triable issue of fact in this case as it related to Plaintiffs' breach of contract 
and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims was whether the October 
17,2007 estoppel certificate's inclusion of inaccurate information proximately caused Plaintiffs' 
damages. See Jury Instruction Nos. 30 and 31; Jury Verdict Form, Question No.1. 
It is well established law in Idaho that when a jury makes its determination of 
causation, it may draw an inference from circumstantial evidence. See Henderson v. Cominco 
American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 518 P.2d 873 (1974); Challis Irrigation Co. v. State, 107 Idaho 
338,689 P.2d 230 (1984). Indeed, this Court should not substitute its determination of cause in 
fact for that of a jury, unless the evidence points only to one reasonable conclusion. See Challis, 
at 344, 689 P.2d at 236. 
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When the fact is that the damages claimed in an action were occasioned by one of 
two causes, for one of which the defendant is responsible, and for the other of 
which it is not responsible, the plaintiff must fail ifhis evidence does not show 
that the damages were produced by the former cause, and he must fail, also, if it is 
just as probable that they were caused by the one as by the other, as the plaintiff is 
bound to make out his case by the preponderance of evidence. The jury must not 
be left to mere conjecture, and a bare possibility ... is not sufficient. 
Dent v. Hardware Mutual Cas. Co., 86 Idaho 427, 435, 388 P.2d 89, 93 (1964) (citations 
omitted). Thus, under Dent, in order to prevail in proving proximate cause, a plaintiff must show 
his inference of causation to be more probable than any opposing inference. See Challis, at 344, 
689 P.2d at 236. 
In this case, the jury was instructed that "proximate cause" means "a cause which, 
in natural or probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that 
cause the damage would not have occurred." See Jury Instr. No. 30 (emphasis added). The jury 
was also instructed that such cause "need not be the only cause" but it does need to be a 
"substantial factor" in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. See id. The jury was also 
instructed that a cause is not a proximate cause "if the injury, loss or damage likely would have 
occurred anyway." See id. The jury was also instructed that the estoppel certificate contained 
two pieces of inaccurate information: (1) that the lease agreement had not been modified, 
supplemented, altered or amended, and (2) representations that all minimum monthly rent had 
been paid. See Jury Instr. No. 31. 
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B. The Evidence 
The evidence at trial relating to causation clearly supported the jury's verdict in 
favor of High Mark. The real estate purchase contract identified High Mark's responsibility for 
providing an estoppel certificate. The contract and its addenda were admitted into evidence as 
Exhibit 5. Addendum No.1 to the contract stated that "Seller shall deliver to Buyer an[] estoppel 
for the Tenant 10 days prior to Closing. Should the information provided on the estoppel differ 
from the information provided by Seiler, Buyer shall have the option to terminate the Agreement 
and receive full refund of Earnest Money." See Trial Ex. 5, at 00034. 
The evidence at trial established that the inaccurate information in the estoppel 
certificate was not a substantial factor or a "but for" cause of Plaintiffs' damages. Plaintiffs 
argue conflicting evidence about the balance sheet to support their arguments for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. However, this Court may not consider any conflicting evidence that 
disputes the non-moving party's case. See Karlson, at 567,97 P.3d at 434. There was 
substantial evidence establishing that Plaintiffs were given and had reviewed the tenant's current 
balance sheet that clearly disclosed a substantial loan from Gordon Arave, a person Plaintiffs 
deemed and perceived as the landlord of the Children's Center. 
The evidence at trial relating to the balance sheet was telling. The balance sheet 
was admitted into evidence as Trial Exhibit N. During direct examination, Tom O'Shea, Jeff 
Needs, Kate Donahue, Kevin Donahue, and Jack Chillemi, testified they had "no clue" about the 
April 18, 2007 promissory note between Gordon Arave and the Children's Center. Plaintiffs also 
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testified that "they would not have closed had they known about the note," that they had not seen 
any balance sheet disclosing a loan between the Children's Center and Gordon Arave, and that 
they had no knowledge of any facts that were inconsistent with the estoppel certificate. 
All of this testimony was impeached during cross examination, which could lead a 
reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiffs had seen the tenant's current balance sheet prior to 
closing, had seen the reference to the promissory note between the tenant and Gordon Arave, and 
that Plaintiffs had lied about not having seen the balance sheet because of the ramifications such 
disclosure would have on the outcome of this lawsuit. Impeachment consisted of Plaintiffs' trial 
testimony they had seen a balance sheet prior to closing, and that the balance sheet they saw was 
the balance sheet contained in the tenant's 2005 and 2006 federal income tax returns. This 
testimony was shown to be false by testimony from Kate Donahue, Jack Chillemi, and Tom 
O'Shea that each Plaintiff, with the exception of Tom O'Shea, only reviewed two pages from 
each of the 2005 and 2006 tax returns, none of which contained the balance sheet they claimed to 
have reviewed. Kevin Donahue testified that he did not review any tax returns of the tenant. 
Plaintiffs were also impeached on the balance sheet issue by prior deposition 
testimony. Thomas O'Shea testified in his deposition that he had not seen a balance sheet, and 
that he had not asked about its whereabouts prior to closing, despite the document being required 
to be produced under the real estate purchase contract. The jury heard relevant portions of 
O'Shea's deposition where he clearly admitted that he had not seen any balance sheet. 
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leffNeeds' trial testimony was likewise impeached. At trial, Needs testified that 
he saw a balance sheet in the tenant's tax returns. Like his boss, Needs' trial testimony differed 
from his deposition testimony, portions of which were read to the jury during Needs' cross 
examination: 
QUESTION: That's your testimony, that you didn't receive a balance sheet? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
QUESTION: And ifit was a condition of the contract and you hadn't received it, 
did you notify anyone that you hadn't received it? 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION: Is there a reason why? 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION: You didn't receive a balance sheet as required under the real 
estate purchase contract and did you have any conversation with Mr. O'Shea 
about that issue? 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION: You didn't have any discussion with anyone about why you didn't 
receive a balance sheet? 
ANSWER: No. 
Jeff Needs Depo., at 55:5-22 (emphasis added). Needs also admitted during cross examination 
that he had met with Plaintiffs' counsel to discuss his testimony about the balance sheet, and that 
they rehearsed testifYing about having seen a balance sheet in the tenant's tax returns. In their 
depositions, Needs and O'Shea, and the other Plaintiffs for that matter, never testified they had 
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seen a balance sheet in the tax returns. Thus, their testimony at trial about having seen a balance 
sheet in the tax returns was completely incredible and the jury could have concluded as much. 
There was substantial evidence that could support a jury finding that the reference 
in the balance sheet to the $187,929.40 loan between Gordon Arave and the tenant was viewed 
by Plaintiffs knowing it referred to a rent deferral or concession. There was substantial evidence 
from Plaintiffs that they and Needs together deemed and perceived Gordon Arave to be the 
landlord at 1675 Curlew, and not a business entity. Needs was clear in testifYing that throughout 
the transaction, before closing, he always considered Gordon Arave to be the seller and landlord. 
Louis Kraml confirmed this by testifYing that in his "chance" meeting with Needs and O'Shea at 
Starbucks, Needs told him he had "done his homework" on Gordon Arave. O'Shea likewise was 
clear in testifYing he always thought Gordon Arave was the landlord ofthe Children's Center. 
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiffs knew the reference in the 
balance sheet to the Arave-Children's Center loan was for a rent concession, or at the very least, 
a loan between the landlord and tenant. 
In sum, if Plaintiffs were lying about not having received the balance sheet, which 
Defendants showed through cross examination of Plaintiffs and Needs, then the jury was clearly 
justified in finding that Plaintiffs had been given the balance sheet, had seen the disclosure in the 
balance sheet indicating an outstanding loan between the landlord and the tenant totaling 
$187,929.40, decided to proceed with the transaction despite this information, which conflicted 
with statements the tenant made in the estoppel certificate, and then ultimately deciding that 
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Defendant did not proximately cause Plaintiffs' damages by virtue of the inaccurate information 
in the October 17, 2007 estoppel certificate. 
The jury would have been justified in finding such fact regardless of Paul Fife's 
testimony that he had not looked at the specific contents of the Federal Express package 
containing the tenant's balance sheet and tax returns. Again, this Court is to ignore any and all 
conflicting evidence that may have been presented to dispute Defendants' case. There was other 
evidence at trial that demonstrated the balance sheet was sent from the tenant, to the seller, and 
then to the buyer. Marc Weinpel testified he faxed his client's tax returns and current balance 
sheet to counsel for High Mark. He also testified that those documents were provided to High 
Mark's counsel under a confidentiality agreement, where the tenant and High Mark agreed to 
only disclose those records to the O'Shea Family Trust for the purpose of the purchase and sale 
of the 1675 Curlew property. There was no evidence that other financial information from the 
tenant was provided to Plaintiffs under a confidentiality agreement. Paul Fife was able to 
identify the transmittal letter from High Mark's attorney, which was admitted as Trial Exhibit T. 
That letter is addressed to Fife and reads: "Please find enclosed herewith the financial records of 
The Children's Center, Inc. requested by the Oshea Family Trust." Trial Ex. T. The letter goes 
on to state that the financial documents are being provided to the trust under a "confidentiality 
agreement." See id. Fife testified he remembered receiving and seeing the transmittal letter, and 
then forwarding the contents to Needs: 
Q: Exhibit *-009 is an August 28 t\ 2007, letter that I sent to you; is that correct? 
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A: Correct. 
Q: It says, please find enclosed herewith the financial records of The Children's 
Center, Inc., requested by the O'Shea Family Trust. Did I read that correctly? 
A: Correct. 
Q: These documents have been provided to me under a confidentiality 
agreement. where we've agreed to only disclose them to the O'Shea Family 
Trustfor the purposes of purchase and sale of the building at issue. Did I read 
that correctly? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Do you remember receiving this? 
A: I do, now that it's in front of me. It was a cover letter for the financial 
information that I forwarded to Jeff Needs. 
Fife Depo., at 74:2-19 (emphasis added). This testimony was read to the jury. By virtue of the 
reference to the confidentiality agreement, the jury could reasonably conclude that Fife, in fact, 
received the tenant's current balance sheet and tax returns from High Mark's counsel and then 
forwarded those to Needs, since these were the only financial records provided to Plaintiffs under 
a confidentiality agreement. Whether Fife inspected the contents of the package that 
accompanied the transmittal letter is of no moment in light of We in pel's testimony that the tax 
returns and the balance sheet were provided to seller's counsel under a confidentiality agreement 
and by the absence of evidence that other financial records were subject to or produced pursuant 
to a confidentiality agreement. 
There was other evidence disputing Plaintiffs' theory that Defendants hid the 
balance sheet and failed to provide it to Plaintiffs, and which further supports the jury's 
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conclusion in Question 1 of the verdict form. Trial Exhibit No. 13 consisted of email 
communications between High Mark's attorney and the tenant's attorney, wherein counsel for the 
seller attempted to schedule a meeting between the tenant and O'Shea on August 29,2007 at 
1 :00 p.m. in order to have the buyer discuss with the tenant the business operations of the tenant. 
Counsel for the seller stated: "If your client is agreeable, we would like to have available for 
review at the meeting a copy of your client's current financial statements, including a current 
balance sheet." See Trial Ex. No. 13 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' theory at trial was, in part, 
based on an argument that Defendants conspired to hide the balance sheet and other information 
from Plaintiffs. Based on Trial Exhibit 13, the jury could have concluded that Plaintiffs' theory 
was incredible, concluding that High Mark's counsel would not have offered to present the 
tenant's current balance sheet to the buyers in a meeting between the tenant and the buyers if 
Defendants were trying to secrete or hide the balance sheet. 
The evidence also demonstrated that, aside from the balance sheet, Fife informed 
Needs about the April 18, 2007 promissory note and that Needs lied about that disclosure. Fife 
testified he told Needs that a promissory note had been released in order to get the tenant to 
release its option to purchase and to sign the October 17,2007 estoppel certificate. The 
testimony on this point was clear: 
Q: Were you aware of apparently the concessions that were granted by Arave to 
The Children's Center in exchange for the lease estoppel certificate? 
A: I was. 
Q: And what did you understand those considerations to be? 
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A: It was a note that The Children's Center owed Gordon [AraveJ in exchange 
for the note. That's what they used to remove the phrase from the document, 
from the lease. 
Q: Which phrase? 
A: The right to repurchase. 
Q: I see. Any other considerations you recall? 
A: Not that I'm aware of 
Q: How did you know that there was this consideration in exchange for the lease 
estoppel certificate? 
A: Well, Gordon told me that that's what they'd come up with to try to make it 
happen. 
Q: Was that communicated to Needs or any other agent of the buyers? 
A: It was. 
Q: And how did you communicate that? 
A: Verbally. 
Fife Depo., at 49:23-50:23 (emphasis added). This testimony was also read into the record. 
Thus, Fife told Needs that the tenant owed Gordon Arave money under a note, and the tenant's 
obligation under that note was released in exchange for signing the estoppel and releasing the 
option to purchase. Thus, not only did Fife, through this conversation, provide the buyer a 
second disclosure ofthe April 18, 2007 note, he also disclosed the existence of the October 18, 
2007 letter agreement as that agreement related to the 1675 Curlew property. See Trial Ex. 24. 
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Plaintiffs argue that Fife's testimony relating to his disclosure to Needs is 
immaterial because Fife testified he did not know whether the April 2007 promissory note related 
to deferred rent payments. However, Fife's testimony in this regard conflicts with other evidence 
that demonstrated that Plaintiffs knew and had reason to know that the note was for a rent 
concession. As stated earlier, substantial evidence was presented at trial showing Plaintiffs 
always deemed and perceived the landlord and seller of 1675 Curlew as Gordon Arave. 
Therefore, whether Fife was familiar with the substance of the April 18, 2007 note is irrelevant, 
since Plaintiffs possessed the balance sheet that disclosed a substantial obligation owed by the 
tenant to someone they perceived as the landlord. The jury could conclude from this evidence 
that Plaintiffs knew, and had reason to know, that the forgiven loan related to a rent obligation or 
concession. Moreover, Fife clearly testified that he told Needs that a debt, owed by the tenant to 
Gordon Arave, was forgiven in exchange for the tenant signing the estoppel certificate and 
releasing its option to purchase. Whether that debt related to a pre-sale agreement for rent 
deferral or for some other purpose is irrelevant; the important point being Plaintiffs were 
informed by Fife that a debt owed by the tenant to Gordon Arave had been forgiven in exchange 
for the release of the option and the signature on the estoppel. 
Needs' trial testimony provides further evidentiary support for the jury's verdict 
on the question of proximate causation. Needs testified during direct examination that Fife only 
told him that the consideration given in exchange for the release of the option was an agreement 
by Gordon Arave to assist the tenant in its lease in Pocatello. Needs therefore testified he and the 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR NEW TRIAL-I 5 1372 
buyers had no knowledge of any note being forgiven in exchange for the estoppel certificate 
being signed and the option to purchase being released. During cross examination, however, 
Needs was again impeached by his prior deposition testimony. Contrary to his trial testimony, 
Needs testified in his deposition that Fife had, in fact, informed him that Gordon Arave had 
either agreed to pay the tenant an amount of money for the option, or had agreed to help the 
tenant in its lease in Pocatello. See Needs' Depo., at 142-44. This testimony was read to the 
jury. Based on Needs' cross examination testimony, the jury would have been justified in 
discounting the testimony of Plaintiffs as well as Needs when they all testified they had "no clue" 
of a promissory note between Gordon Arave and the tenant, and had seen nothing that 
contradicted the information in the estoppel certificate. 
There was other substantial evidence that the estoppel certificate, despite its 
inaccurate information, was not the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' damages. The jury was shown 
2005 and 2006 tax returns and a partial 2007 profit and loss statement of the tenant, all of which 
disclosed that the tenant was in financial trouble. Plaintiffs testified, as did Needs, that they were 
all concerned about the tenant's financial condition and its overhead. Kate Donahue testified that 
she viewed the tenant's expenses as "heavy." The balance sheet itself included additional 
evidence of the tenant's poor financial condition and heavy expenses, including disclosure of a 
loan for payroll obligations, as well as other substantial liabilities. 
There was also evidence from Weinpel indicating that management fees and 
insurance costs of the landlord were not called for under the lease agreement, were not being paid 
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by the tenant, that those expenses, if required to be paid by the tenant, would have increased the 
tenant's overhead expenses and kept the tenant in their poor financial state, and that the October 
17, 2007 estoppel certificate was itself an amendment to the lease agreement. Indeed, in his 
letter dated October 16, 2007, the day before the final estoppel certificate was signed, Weinpel 
wrote: "I have reviewed the proposed 'new' Lease Estoppel Certificate with Mr. Smith and it is 
ourfeeling that we would be tacitly modifYing the lease by signing the same." See Trial Ex. No. 
50 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs were well aware ofthe tenant's trepidation in signing the 
estoppel as drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel. See Trial Exs. CC and AA. Based on this evidence, 
the jury could have reasonably concluded that Plaintiffs' actions in insisting the tenant sign an 
estoppel certificate that obligated the tenant to pay management fees and insurance costs of the 
landlord priced the tenant out of the building due to a potential increase in their overhead 
expenses. Indeed, the jury could have concluded from this evidence that but for Plaintiffs' 
insisting the tenant agree in the estoppel certificate to pay management fees and insurance costs 
of the landlord, which the tenant viewed as an amendment to the lease agreement, Plaintiffs 
caused their own damages. Indeed, the jury could have found that High Mark was not the cause 
of damages in this regard in light of what the real estate purchase contract states regarding 
inaccurate infonnation in the estoppel certificate and that seller becomes responsible for such 
only if infonnation contained in the estoppel was different from infonnation provided by the 
seller. See Trial Ex. 5, Addendum No.1, at page 00034. 
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There was evidence that Plaintiffs clearly knew the tenant was not paying 
management fees and insurance costs of the landlord. In Trial Exhibit ecce, O'Shea told 
Needs: "We are trying to have the tenant absorb the cost of management." In Trial Exhibit DD, 
Needs wrote to Fife: "Tenant must acknowledge that management fees and insurance costs of 
landlord are 'Triple Net' charges and paid for by tenant. Since Tenant is already being billed, 
and is paying these charges, we do not see why Tenant is unwilling to do this, unless they do 
have an issue." Plaintiffs were informed the tenant was not paying such charges and objected to 
paying such charges because they were not required under the lease agreement. See Trial Ex. CC 
(stating that tenant "voiced several concerns about the estoppel [which were] focused on 
paragraphs 1,4 and 5 ... where representations are made about ... the tenant's obligation to pay 
property management fees, and the tenant's obligation to carry insurance coverage for property 
damage with 100% replacement cost coverage ... "). 
Needs testified during cross examination that he "relied mostly on the lease" and 
"on the fact that the tenant we had been told was a strong tenant, had been paying every monthly 
rent on time, in a timely manner, had been a great tenant," in purchasing the property. Needs did 
not include the estoppel certificate in this list of what he, and by imputation, the buyers relied on 
for purchasing the property. During cross examination, Needs explained the conversation where 
he and the buyers were told that the tenant was "strong" and had been paying "every monthly rent 
on time." Needs confirmed his deposition testimony, where he stated that Fife had simply opined 
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to Needs and O'Shea that "as far as he knew," the tenant had been paying rent fine in Pocatello 
and Idaho Falls. 
That the estoppel certificate was not a substantial factor in the buyers' decision to 
purchase the property is further evidenced by testimony from O'Shea and the Donahues that the 
purchase of 1675 Curlew was a 1031 Exchange, and that Plaintiffs were irrevocably identified in 
the 1675 Curlew property 45 days after August 21,2007, the date of at least one of the sales of 
property that was the subject of the exchange. O'Shea and the Donahues all testified that it was 
important for this transaction to proceed as a 1031 Exchange so they could personally defer 
income tax liabilities. O'Shea testified that in order for a 1031 Exchange to take place, the 
replacement property must be identified within 45 days of the sale of the corresponding property. 
O'Shea and Kate Donahue both confirmed that one ofthe properties that was the subject of this 
exchange was the "25th Street" property in Oakland, California, which was owned collectively by 
Kate and Kevin Donahue, and the O'Sheas. According to Kate Donahue's testimony, the sale of 
that property occurred on August 21, 2007. By October 5,2007, forty-five days after August 21, 
2007, the O'Sheas and the Donahues were irrevocably identified in the 1675 Curlew property. 
From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that as of October 5, 2007, Plaintiffs did 
not rely on any information related to the tenant, whether that information was accurate or not. 
Thus, the inaccurate estoppel certificate of October 17, 2007 could not have proximately caused 
Plaintiffs' damages in this case. I 
lWhile the Court ruled in footnote 1 of its Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions 
for Summary Judgment ("Summary Judgment Order") that "the issue is what information was 
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II. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY'S CONCLUSION 
THAT HIGH MARK DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD. 
A. The Law 
Substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion that High Mark did not 
commit fraud. The jury was instructed that in order for High Mark to be liable for fraud, Plaintiff 
had to prove ten elements by clear and convincing evidence. These elements are: (1) High Mark 
stated a fact to the buyers, (2) the statement was false, (3) the statement was material, (4) High 
Mark either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the statement was true at 
the time the statement was made, (5) the plaintiff did not know that the statement was false, (6) 
the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner 
reasonably contemplated, (7) the plaintiff did rely upon the truth of the statement, (8) the 
plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances, (9) the plaintiff suffered damages 
actually received by the Plaintiffs, not what information the Plaintiffs could have discovered 
through their own investigation," the jury was never instructed on this point. The only jury 
instruction given on the issue of Plaintiffs' conducting their own independent investigation 
related to Plaintiffs' fraud claims, not Plaintiffs' contract claims. In this regard, the jury was 
instructed that "[i]t is not a defense to fraud that Plaintiffs could have, by independent 
investigation, ascertained the truth from other sources." Jury Instr. No. 37 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs did not object to Jury Instruction No. 37, or to the absence of an instruction that tracked 
footnote I of the Court's Summary Judgment Order. Based on Instruction No. 37 and the 
substantial evidence at trial relating to Plaintiffs' lack of due diligence, the jury was further 
justified in finding that the inaccurate information in the estoppel certificate was not a proximate 
cause of Plaintiffs' contract damages. Indeed, there was substantial evidence admitted at trial 
relating to this issue without objection by Plaintiffs. Some of that evidence was invited by 
Plaintiffs' own questioning of witnesses, and was acknowledged by the Court. In a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court's inquiry is focused on the evidence admitted at 
trial. See Bates, 146 Idaho at 776,203 P.3d at 706. 
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proximately caused by reliance on the false statement, and (10) the nature and extent of damages 
to the plaintiff. See Jury Instr. No. 33. Clear and convincing evidence was defined for the jury: 
"Y ou must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher 
burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true." See 
Jury Instr. No. 12 (emphasis added). The jury was further instructed that a statement is 
"material" for purposes of fraud "if (a) a reasonable person would attach importance to its 
existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the transaction in question, or (b) 
the person making the disclosure or failing to disclose knows or has reason to know that the 
recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in determining the choice of action, whether 
or not a reasonable person would so consider." See Jury Instr. No. 35. The jury was also 
instructed that "information contained in advertisements and promotional material can not be the 
basis for a claim of misrepresentation." See Jury Instr. No. 36. 
B. The Evidence 
A reasonable jury could conclude that the only statements attributable to High 
Mark consisted of the LoopNet ad (Trial Ex. No.4), verbal statements from Fife that "as far as he 
knew," the tenant had paid rent fine in Pocatello and Idaho Falls (Testimony of Jeff Needs), and 
the so-called income and expense statements showing "Rents Received from 612006 through 
7/2007." See Trial Ex. Nos. 14 and 20. As a matter oflaw, the LoopNet ad and the statements 
from Fife could not support Plaintiffs' fraud claim based on Jury Instruction No. 36 
("[I]nformation contained in advertisements and promotional material can not be the basis for a 
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claim of misrepresentation"), and Jury Instruction No. 33 (fraud requires a finding that 
"defendant stated a/act to the plaintiff'). This Court ruled as a matter oflaw that Fife's 
statements, as qualified, do not constitute a representation of fact but rather an opinion. See 
Summary Judgment Order, at 12. 
The so-called income and expense statements were not communicated or provided 
to the buyers with the intent they rely on them or act upon them in a manner reasonably 
contemplated. Gordon Arave testified that High Mark did not know that the so-called income 
and expense statements were going to be provided to Plaintiffs, and, more importantly, if they 
were provided, they were not provided with any intent on the part of High Mark for Plaintiffs to 
rely on them for purposes of determining the financial health of the tenant or seller, or to 
determine whether the transaction was worth doing. 
There was no evidence that Trial Exhibit Nos. 14 and 20 were provided by High 
Mark as part of High Mark's obligation under the purchase agreement to provide financial 
information related to the tenant. While Plaintiffs may have considered the "Rents Received" 
document as an income and expense statement under the real estate purchase contract, there is no 
evidence that High Mark or any of the defendants viewed or perceived that document as a 
representation of rents paid and received that the plaintiffs could rely on in determining the 
financial condition of the tenant or the seller for that matter, or that Defendants knew Plaintiffs 
perceived that document as the income and expense report under the real estate purchase 
contract. There was no testimony from Fife that he intended Exhibits 14 and 20 as 
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representations to Plaintiffs as to amounts of actual rents paid and received. Importantly, the fax 
cover page from Needs to O'Shea that accompanied the "Rents Received" document in Trial 
Exhibit 20 states that Needs did not even view the "Rents Received" document as a 
representation of rents and CAM charges paid and received. Needs' fax cover sheet states: 
"Tom, attached is the expense hilling to tenant showing insurance and accounting along with a 
letter from Seller stating that he will pay all assumptions fees above 1 %. Call if you have 
questions. Thanks." See Trial Ex. No. 20, page 000 158 (emphasis added). The jury could 
reasonably conclude from this exhibit that Needs only viewed the "Rents Received" document as 
an expense billing and accounting to the tenant, not as a representation from the seller to the 
buyer about how much rent was, in fact, paid and received. That knowledge is imputed to 
O'Shea by virtue of Jury Instruction No. 23. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably 
conclude that Exhibits 14 and 20 do not constitute a statement of material fact by High Mark, or 
that High Mark intended Plaintiffs to rely and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated. 
There was evidence presented at trial that disputed the amounts in Exhibits 14 and 
20, and therefore militated against Plaintiffs reliance on those documents and reliance on the 
estoppel certificate. Trial Exhibit PP was provided to Plaintiffs before closing and showed 
deficit balances in CAM charges. Plaintiffs downplay this evidence by arguing that this 
document only showed a deficit balance as it related to property taxes that had been assessed and 
not yet paid. This argument, however, ignores the evidence in both Exhibit PP, and the 
testimony from O'Shea and the other Plaintiffs. On its face, Exhibit PP refers to not just a deficit 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR NEW TRIAL-23 1380 
balance in property taxes. It also refers to more than one deficit balance by using the plural term 
"deficit balances." O'Shea also admitted that he and the other Plaintiffs sued Defendants 
claiming Plaintiffs were never told that a deficit balance was owed in CAM charges in the 
amount identified in Trial Exhibit PP. This claim in Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was 
read to the jury: "On November 27,2007, Gordon Arave sent to the President of The Children's 
Center information showing that, through December 31, 2007, The Children's Center then owed 
$26,221.22 in CAM charges." The jury could conclude from this evidence that Plaintiffs were 
not justified in relying on any of the purported income statements and, moreover, that it was 
unreasonable for them to rely on those documents to the extent they claim they did. 
There was substantial evidence at trial that defendants and their agents were not 
responsible for making any of the statements about rents having been paid. Indeed, there is no 
evidence in the record that High Mark or its agents contributed to the drafting ofthe estoppel 
certificates as they related to the payment of rents. The only evidence of contribution to the 
estoppel certificates was High Mark's inclusion of revisions to the estoppel as set forth in High 
Mark's counsel's letter at Trial Exhibit CC, none of which related to the payment of rents. There 
was substantial evidence that Michael Shiffman was the only drafter of the estoppel certificate's 
provisions relating to rent payments being paid up to and including September 2007. See Trial 
Ex. AA (fax from Needs to Fife stating "Tom has asked his attorney to prepare an estoppel for 
tenant which will be available to you Monday afternoon for review"). 
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There was substantial evidence that could support the jury finding that Plaintiffs 
knew ofthe April 18, 2007 promissory note, knew it was for rent concessions, and knew that 
note had been released by Arave to induce the tenant to sign the estoppel and release the purchase 
option under the lease agreement. As set forth above, Fife disclosed this aspect of the October 
18, 2007 agreement to Needs. That disclosure is imputed to Plaintiffs by virtue of Jury 
Instruction No. 23. 
Plaintiffs fail to argue any evidence relating to the issue of materiality, and yet this 
is a key element of their fraud claim, and was a key factual issue at trial. There was substantial 
evidence that the Children's Center's payment of some rent through promissory notes was not a 
material fact. Smith and Weinpel both testified that the business model of the Children's Center, 
throughout 2007 and even after closing, was to consolidate and centralize its operations in its 
1675 Curlew lease. Weinpel told High Mark's counsel this fact, which High Mark's counsel 
confirmed in Trial Exhibit 19 ("To summarize, you indicated the Children's Center is interested 
in centralizing its operations in the Idaho Falls building .... "). Smith confirmed that this was the 
business plan of the Children's Center in his cross-examination testimony. This fact was further 
confirmed by Smith's admissions during cross-examination that Advanced Practice Management 
("APM") was established to assist the Children's Center in centralizing in 1675 Curlew, and that 
APM was occupying the second floor of 1675 Curlew in February 2008, two months after 
closing occurred. See Trial Ex. SSS. A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that 
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the tenant's payment of rent through the use of promissory notes in April 2007 and then in 
November 2007 was not a material fact. 
Other evidence supported the jury's finding that the alleged misrepresentations 
were not material. Gordon Arave testified to the long history his family-related companies had 
with Matt Smith, M. Smith Enterprises, LLC, and the Children's Center. The testimony 
indicated that history extended back to 2003 and consisted of millions of dollars paid in rent to 
Arave-family businesses. The jury could conclude from this history that the note in November 
2007 handling two months of rent, and the note in April 2007 handling prior months' rent and 
which preceded the transaction, were immaterial facts for purposes of Plaintiffs' fraud claims. 
Importantly, based on that history, the jury could reasonably conclude that High Mark did not 
know and had no reason to know that Plaintiffs would regard the tenant's payment ofa few 
months' rent through executing promissory notes was important in determining whether to 
proceed with the transaction. Furthermore, there was evidence that the tenant was still growing 
its business at the 1675 Curlew property, and had high expenses in 2006 as a result of growing its 
business. The plaintiffs clearly had this information, and the evidence indicated that this was the 
same information that the seller and its agents had. Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that 
given the long and established history ofthe tenant in prior leases, the tenant's payment of rent 
by executing promissory notes for a few months' rent was not a material fact that was 
misrepresented to Plaintiffs. 
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There was substantial evidence at trial that the meeting between Matt Smith, Marc 
Weinpel, and Scott Williams relating to the payment of rent did not occur as recalled by Smith or 
Weinpel. There was substantial evidence presented during the cross-examination of Smith that 
he outright lied about the substance of the meeting with Williams. This testimony included 
Smith's admission that APM was actually occupying the second floor of 1675 Curlew at the time 
the tenant conducted its corporate meeting approving the management contract between the 
tenant and APM, which was February 7,2008. See Trial Ex. No. SSS. Moreover, Smith and 
Weinpel could not get their stories straight about what was said in the alleged meeting with 
Williams. According to Weinpel, he and Smith told Williams merely that the tenant could not 
pay rent at the time of the meeting. This was confirmed by Weinpel in a memorandum to 
Williams dated October 15, 2007, where Weinpel told Williams "[w]e are unable to pay High 
Mark today [October 15, 2007] and we will advise when those monies maybe available." See 
Trial Ex. No. 23 (emphasis added). Gordon Arave testified it was company policy that if rent 
was paid at any point in the month, it was not deemed late. 
Smith clearly lied about the substance of the meeting with Williams by testifying 
that he told Williams that the tenant was going to move out of the building at any time because it 
could not afford rent anymore. This aspect ofthe meeting was not testified to by Weinpel, and as 
stated above, Smith admitted during cross-examination that the Children's Center had become 
too large to manage on its own, therefore APM was formed to manage the Children's Center, and 
was occupying the second floor at 1675 Curlew at the time closing occurred. Moreover, Weinpel 
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confirmed that the reason the tenant vacated the premises at 1675 Curlew was because of 
Plaintiffs' eviction notice. On January 24,2008, Needs sent the tenant an eviction notice, stating 
that "[i]n the event you fail to bring your rent payments current, we shall immediately take legal 
action to evict you and to recover rents and damages for the unlawful detention of said 
premises." Trial Ex. No. 35. Weinpel responded to this letter by stating: "Please be advised that, 
pursuant to your Notice to Quit, the Children's Center Inc. will be completely vacated from the 
premises at 1675 Curlew Drive, Ammon, Idaho effective March 1,2008 at noon." Trial Ex. No. 
36 (emphasis added). That the tenant allegedly told Williams that it was not going to pay rent 
anymore and was going to move out of the building is unsupported by the evidence, and the jury 
could have thus found. 
There was substantial evidence that supported the jury finding that Plaintiffs did 
not reasonably rely on any of the alleged misrepresentations. Plaintiffs knew about the April 18, 
2007 promissory note by virtue of the balance sheet and Fife's disclosure of a note being released 
in exchange for the estoppel signature and option release. Plaintiffs perceived Gordon Arave as 
the landlord and seller of 1675 Curlew. The O'Sheas and Donahues were irrevocably identified 
in the 1675 Curlew property as of October 5,2007. It was clear at trial that Plaintiffs would not 
have closed on the purchase if they could not do so as part of a 1031 Exchange. Thus, substantial 
evidence supported a finding that Plaintiffs did not reasonably rely on any claimed 
misrepresentations. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR ALTERNATIVELY, FOR NEW TRlAL-28 1385 
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE JURY FINDING IN 
FAVOR OF HIGH MARK AND GORDON ARA VE ON THE FRAUD BY 
NONDISCLOSURE CLAIM. 
A. The Law 
Substantial evidence supported the jury's conclusion that High Mark and Gordon 
Arave did not commit fraud by nondisclosure. The jury was instructed that in order for 
Defendant High Mark to be liable for fraud by non-disclosure, Plaintiff had to prove eight 
elements by clear and convincing evidence. These elements are: (1) that one party was in 
possession of a vital fact, (2) that there was a nondisclosure of that fact to the other party, (3) that 
the nondisclosure was material, (4) that the party claiming nondisclosure was unaware of the 
vital fact not disclosed, (5) that the party failing to disclose knew that the other party did not 
know that fact, (6) that there was reasonable reliance upon the nondisclosure, (7) that the party 
suffered damages proximately caused by the nondisclosure, and (8) the nature and extent of the 
damages to that party and the amount thereof. See Jury Instruction No. 34. The jury was also 
instructed that in order to find Gordon Arave liable for fraud by nondisclosure, the jury had to 
find that he "specifically direct[ ed], actively participate[ d] in, or knowingly acquiesce[ d] in the 
fraud or other wrongdoing of the company." See Jury Instr. No. 38. 
B. The Evidence 
Gordon Arave testified that he had nothing to do with the drafting of the estoppel 
certificate. Plaintiffs produced zero evidence to dispute this testimony. Gordon Arave testified 
that during October and November 2007, he was tending to business in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 
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had put Scott Williams in charge of issues relating to rent and the Children's Center. Gordon 
Arave testified that Fife, Williams, and Armstrong were not his agents, and instead were agents 
of High Mark. 
Plaintiffs again completely ignore the element of materiality on their 
nondisclosure claim. The only argument they make in this regard is that Plaintiffs all testified 
they would not have entered into the transaction had they known rent was not paid for October 
and November 2007. Plaintiffs then conclude that this testimony makes the nondisclosure 
material. This argument ignores key evidence relating to the lack of materiality of the alleged 
nondisclosure. Again, on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, this Court "'does 
not examine any conflicting evidence presented by the moving party to refute'" the other side's 
case. Karlson, at 567,97 P.3d at 434 (quoting Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 
P.2d 429, 431 (1981)). Arave, Smith, and Weinpel all testified that the business model and plan 
of the tenant was to centralize its operations in the 1675 Curlew property. Smith testified that the 
tenant had become too big and therefore they were going to cut back in Pocatello and centralize 
at 1675 Curlew. Smith confirmed this fact in his testimony relating to APM. That company was 
formed to manage the tenant at 1675 Curlew. APM occupied the second floor of 1675 Curlew in 
February 2008. Smith and Weinpel both presented conflicting versions of what was said in the 
meeting with Williams. The jury could easily discount their testimony relating to the meeting. 
Weinpel also testified the reason the Children's Center vacated 1675 Curlew was because of 
Plaintiffs' eviction notice. See Trial Ex. Nos. 35 and 36. 
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The April 18, 2007 note, even assuming it was not disclosed, was not a material 
fact because that related to a rent concession that preceded the sale by at least eight months. 
Given the complete lack of temporal connection to the sale, and in light of Jury Instruction No. 
35, the jury could reasonably conclude the April 18, 2007 note was not a material fact that should 
have been disclosed. 
Plaintiffs argue that Gordon Arave testified that "informing the Plaintiffs of the 
existence of the November 2007 note may have been the right thing to do." See PIs' Mem., at 
16. Plaintiffs do not attach any record to support this testimony, and Defendants dispute that this 
was Gordon Arave's testimony, and that it is taken out of context in Plaintiffs' briefing. 
Assuming that this was Gordon Arave's testimony, Gordon Arave was clear in testifYing that he 
had no idea the tenant was going to stop paying rent altogether and move out of 1675 Curlew. 
To the contrary, Gordon Arave confirmed his understanding of the tenant's business model and 
plan of centralizing its operations at 1675 Curlew. 
As set forth above, there was substantial evidence from Gordon Arave and Smith 
relating to the well-established history ofthe Children's Center and other Smith-related entities 
paying millions of dollars in rent to High Mark and Arave-related entities. This history, 
combined with the tenant's business model of consolidating its operations at 1675 Curlew, could 
support the jury in finding the failure to disclose the November 2007 note was not material. 
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IV. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE JURY'S 
FINDING OF NO DAMAGES. 
The nature and amount of Plaintiffs' damages was an essential element of 
Plaintiffs' contract and fraud claims. See Jury Instr. Nos. 31,33, and 34. Defendants asserted a 
mitigation of damages defense to Plaintiffs' damages case. On this point, the jury was instructed 
that "[a] person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and 
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered." See Jury Instr. No. 41. 
Plaintiffs failed to prove up the amount of their damages, and, more importantly, 
Defendants disproved the amount of Plaintiffs' damages. On the issue of damages, Plaintiffs 
presented the testimony of David Smith, CPA. Smith did not opine on Defendants' liability, and 
his opinion relating to damages assumed liability. Smith presented two alternative theories of 
damages: (1) lost profits, and (2) lost value. See Trial Ex. No. 47, at 000245. Under his lost 
profits theory, Smith opined that damages totaled $801,594, and under his lost value theory, 
Smith opined that damages totaled $1,363,648. Smith testified that with liability assumed, the 
most reasonable way to make Plaintiffs whole was through Smith's lost profits theory. 
Defendants demonstrated through the testimony of Brent Butikofer that Plaintiffs 
failed to mitigate their lost profits beginning in January 2008 and therefore Plaintiffs were not 
entitled to recover any lost profits. Butikofer testified that he suggested Plaintiffs demise the 
property. This was based on his assessment that the property would be easier to re-lease if it 
could be leased to numerous tenants as opposed to just one. The cost of demising was cheap and 
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not cost-prohibitive. Butikofer established this fact by his admission that demising the property 
would only require "a couple of sledge-hammers." Butikofer sent Plaintiffs an email on July 7, 
2008 telling Plaintiffs that there were "serious inquiries" from 3 or 4 potential tenants, but those 
tenants ultimately lost interest due to the property not being demised. See Trial Ex. DDDD. 
Plaintiffs never consulted with an architect, contractor, or engineer to determine the feasibility of 
demising the property. Plaintiffs merely assumed that demising would be too expensive, and 
therefore chose not to demise. The jury could conclude from this evidence that Plaintiffs did not 
exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and to prevent further damage from accruing. See 
Jury Instr. No. 41. 
Needs testified that once the Children's Center failed to pay rent in January 2008, 
he immediately instigated eviction proceedings. This was done pursuant to orders from his boss, 
O'Shea. The date of the eviction notice was January 24,2008. See Trial Ex. No. 35. Plaintiffs 
did not try to resolve any payment concerns of the tenant, and did not work with the tenant to try 
to avoid their vacating the premises. Indeed, Weinpel testified that the tenant decided to abandon 
its lease at 1675 Curlew because afNeeds' eviction notice. See Trial Ex. No. 36 ("Please be 
advised that,pursuant to your Notice to Quit, the Children's Center Inc. will be completely 
vacated from the premises at 1675 Curlew Drive, Ammon, Idaho effective March 1,2008 at 
noon."). There was substantial evidence that Plaintiffs considered it reasonable to negotiate with 
a current tenant in order to resolve rent payment issues. In this regard, there was substantial 
evidence of Plaintiffs having negotiated with their current tenant, the Family Care Center, to 
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work out rent payment problems, instead of immediately instigating eviction proceedings. 
Plaintiffs testified that they went so far as to amend their lease agreement with the Family Care 
Center on two different occasions in order to help the Family Care Center remain in the building. 
See Trial Ex. Nos. 54 and 55. There was substantial evidence that Plaintiffs failed to negotiate 
with the Children's Center when rent was not paid in January 2008. The jury could conclude 
from this evidence that, as of January 24,2008, Plaintiffs failed to minimize their damages and to 
prevent further damages from accruing, and that such failure prevented Plaintiffs from recovering 
any amount of damages. 
v. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR BURDEN OF SHOWING 
ENTITLEMENT TO A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs' motion and memorandum are devoid of argument in support oftheir 
motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs fail to set forth any facts or legal arguments to demonstrate that 
a different result would follow a retrial. To prevail in a request for a new trial, where sufficiency 
of the evidence is challenged, "[t]he judge must . .. conclude that a different result would follow 
a retrial." Hudelson v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). 
Moreover, Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial does not comply with Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a), which 
states that a motion pursuant to paragraph (a)(6) "must set forth the factual grounds therefor with 
particularity." By failing to provide any argument on the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes 
of Rule 59's standard of review, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with Rule 59's "particularity" 
requirement. 
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Aside from these problems, the jury's verdict in this case as it relates to Questions 
1, 2, 3, and 6 of the Verdict Form was not clearly against the weight of the evidence, and a 
different result would not follow a retrial. The evidence clearly supported the jury's verdict as 
set forth above in Points I through IV. Simply put, Plaintiffs failed to prove up causation and 
fraud. The plaintiffs were caught in numerous inconsistencies between their sworn trial 
testimony and their sworn deposition testimony. Not one Defendant was impeached by prior 
deposition testimony. They were consistent in their testimony throughout. Plaintiffs and their 
lead witness, Needs, realized their case against Defendants was dead by virtue of the tenant's 
current balance sheet. They therefore lied from the beginning about not having received it, and 
then lied at trial about having received a balance sheet, albeit a balance sheet in the tenant's tax 
returns. Fortunately for Defendants, the jury saw through those lies. 
Based on the entire record, the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence. The 
evidence clearly supported the jury finding that Plaintiffs caused their own damages, that they 
knew about the April 18, 2007 promissory note, its release in exchange for the estoppel 
certificate and purchase option, and that the April and November 2007 promissory notes were not 
material facts. The jury had clear and undisputed evidence of the tenant's long and established 
leasing history, which started in 2003 and encompassed the payment of over $1 million in rents 
to High Mark and other Arave-family businesses. The jury was properly instructed on the law. 
The evidence admitted was properly admitted. The ends of justice clearly do not support a retrial 
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here because a different result would not follow a retrial. The Court should therefore deny 
Plaintiffs' alternative request for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request the Court deny 
Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, alternatively, for a new trial. 
DATED this loth day of May, 2010. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
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LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
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REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR NEW TiI1t eS 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, the law 
firm of Hopkins Roden Crockett Hansen & Hoopes, PLLC, Idaho Falls, Idaho, and 
submit this Reply Briefin Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
or, Alternatively, for New Trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(b) and 59(a)(6). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Breach of Contract. 
1. There was no substantial evidence presented that the Plaintiffs 
or their agents ever saw the balance sheet at Defendants' Exhibit N; and, even if 
there were such evidence, it did not substantially contradict Plaintiffs' claim of 
damages. 
Defendants' analysis of the breach of contract claim exaggerates the 
evidence and fails to take into account the nature of High Mark's breach. Instmction No. 
31 set forth that High Mark breached the contract by making false representations that (a) 
"the Lease had not been modified, supplemented, altered or amended," and (b) "all 
minimum monthly rent had been paid." The question in Instmction No. 31 is whether the 
false statements of High Mark proximately caused the Plaintiffs' damages; albeit not the 
only cause. 
Even assuming there was evidence that the Plaintiffs received the August 
28, 2007 balance sheet, there was no substantial evidence indicating whatsoever that 
Plaintiffs should have known that the Lease had been amended or modified, or that full 
rent had not been paid. In order to disprove Plaintiffs' claim of breach of contract 
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damages, Defendants must have shown that Plaintiffs knew the misrepresentations in the 
Estoppel Certificate were false. But the August 28, 2007 balance sheet did address either 
of these points. In other words, the balance sheet did nothing to contradict the false and 
misleading statements made in the Estoppel Certificate. 
On the record at the jury instruction conference, Plaintiffs asked that the 
COUli add an instruction that stated that "No evidence has been presented that any of the 
Plaintiffs or their agents ever saw the Balance Sheet dated August 28, 2007 (Defendants' 
Exhibit N)." Plaintiffs could not perceive any evidence supporting Defendants' claim to 
this effect, and, other than circumstantial inferences, neither could Defendants' counsel. 
Although the instruction was not given, the fact remained that this crucial evidence to the 
Defendants' case was not presented and does not exist. 
Defendants claim that they impeached the Plaintiffs' testimony regarding 
the balance sheet, but the evidence showed quite the contrary. Plaintiffs and their agents 
testified, both at deposition and in the trial, that they had never seen the August 28, 2007 
balance sheet at Exhibit N. Throughout the case, Defendants' counsel had asked only 
about the August 28, 2007 balance sheet, and Plaintiffs had consistently stated that they 
had not seen it. Evidence about the August 28, 2007 balance sheet making it to the 
Plaintiffs or their agents simply did not exist. 
The April 28, 2007 balance sheet did not constitute substantial evidence 
SuppOliing the Defendants' case. 
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2. There was no substantial evidence during trial that Jeff Needs 
was told about the non-payment of rent or any modifications or amendments to the 
Lease. 
At trial, Paul Fife testified that he told leffNeeds that a note owed by The 
Children's Center to Gordon Arave constituted consideration for the Estoppel Certificate 
being signed. Even taking this evidence as true, this conversation did not contradict the 
misleading statements of the Estoppel Certificate, as Fife mentioned neither a 
modification to the Lease Agreement or the non-payment of rent. And contrary to 
Defendants' assertions, it certainly said nothing about the existence of the October 18, 
2007 letter agreement which, ironically, forever relieved the Center from paying rent for 
that particular period. Any inference arising from the statement of Paul Fife did not 
constitute "substantial evidence." 
Defendants assert that whether the debt mentioned on the August 28, 2007 
balance sheet or allegedly discussed by Fife "related to a pre-sale agreement for rent 
deferral or for some other purpose is irrelevant." (emphasis added.) Plaintiffs beg to 
differ. Whether Lease modifications and the non-payment of rent were disclosed is 
extremely relevant in determining whether Plaintiffs were damaged. Based upon the 
evidence presented, reasonable minds could have wondered why High Mark had to be so 
secretive. Why did not High Mark or Gordon Arave simply disclose the material, 
relevant and misrepresented facts? 
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Defendants next argue that Needs' testimony regarding his understanding 
of the consideration given for the signed Estoppel Certificate was impeached. Needs 
testified at trial that he believed Arave was going to help with the Pocatello property. His 
deposition testimony stated that he thought the consideration was some assistance with 
the Pocatello property or payment of some money. This is not impeachment testimony, 
as it did not contradict his trial testimony. Furthermore, it does not contradict Needs' 
most fundamental testimony that he had no knowledge of a rent defenal note being 
forgiven in exchange for the Estoppel Certificate being signed. 
3. Defendants mischaracterize other evidence, all of which did not 
substantially support the verdict. 
Defendants fUliher argue that the Plaintiffs were concerned about financial 
documents they reviewed, including the 2005 and 2006 tax returns and a 2007 profit and 
loss statement. Plaintiffs' actual testimony was that although they noticed the Center's 
expenses, they understood the Center to be a growing business and they felt that the 
expenses compared with the gross receipts were not consequential. The tax returns and 
Profit and Loss Statement did not conflict with this basic understanding. Furthermore, 
even with all of the Center's growth, the expenses for the first half of2007 as shown on 
the Profit and Loss Statement indicated the Center was having a very good year. 
Defendants utterly mischaracterize the Plaintiffs' testimony in this regard. 
Defendants also mischaracterize Plaintiffs' understanding of the Center's 
payment of management fees, taxes and insurance costs. The testimony at trial was that 
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Plaintiffs understood that the Center was already paying these costs. Matthew Smith 
testified that the Center was paying these costs. The Lease was not clear in this regard, 
and the Plaintiffs testified that they wanted clarification and to eliminate chances for 
misunderstanding. The Lease stated that "Lessee, at Lessee's sole cost, shall maintain 
every part of the Premises in good order, condition and repair and in a clean and sanitary 
condition." Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8. "All real or personal property taxes associated with the 
leased premises shall be paid by Lessee." Id. "The parties agree that this is a 'Triple 
Net' lease with all costs associated with the use of this building bome by the Lessee." Id. 
Several witnesses testified that "Triple Net" constituted management fees, taxes and 
insurance. Not surprisingly, Defendants also believed the Center was obligated to pay 
these fees and that signing the Estoppel Celiificate would not constitute a modification of 
the Lease. See Respondents' Exhibit 0 (letter from Richard Armstrong to Marc Weinpel, 
also stating that "the estoppel certificate states exactly what is provided for under the 
lease agreement"). 
Defendants assume that since the Plaintiffs had identified the 1675 Curlew 
property as part of their 1031 Exchange, their hands were tied as of October 5, 2007. 
This was not the testimony or evidence presented. Plaintiffs testified that they had 
several propeliies across the country which qualified for a 1031 exchange. They merely 
had to identify a propeliy within 45 days. Plaintiffs further testified that if the Ammon 
property ultimately did not work, they easily could have selected another property within 
the appropriate time period. 
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Finally, it is a gross distortion to argue that the Plaintiffs did not rely on the 
Estoppel Certificate in making their decision to purchase. Every Plaintiff, including Jeff 
Needs, stated that they relied on Estoppel Celiificate statements that the lease had not 
been modified and all rent had been paid. This was crucial to their understanding of the 
Center as a successful tenant. And it was provided by High Mark Development. 
In short, Defendants presented no evidence that the Plaintiffs were aware 
that rent had not been paid for a significant amount of time, or that the Lease had been 
modified. Substantial evidence did not exist that the Plaintiffs had not relied upon these 
highly misleading statements, to their detriment. 
B. Fraud and Nondisclosure. 
t. Defendant High Mark Development sent to the Plaintiffs several 
fraudulent documents, most important of which were the Estoppel Certificate and 
the Income and Expense Statements. 
Defendants suggest that High Mark did not have any paIi in providing 
fraudulent documents. There is no question that the Defendant High Mark had a 
contractual obligation to provide the Estoppel Certificate and did in fact procure and send 
that document to the Plaintiffs. There is also no question that the Estoppel Certificate 
contained false and fi-audulent statements of fact. This Court has previously recognized 
that whether or not High Mark actually signed the Estoppel Certificate or contributed to 
its drafting is not relevant to whether the Certificate constituted a statement made directly 
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by High Mark, pursuant to its obligation under the Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
Defendants omit the Estoppel Certificate completely from their analysis of fraud. 
There was also no dispute that High Mark sent the income and expense 
statements (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 14 & 20) to the Plaintiffs. To argue that this document 
was not sent to Plaintiffs as part of High Mark's obligation to provide financial 
infol1nation, or that High Mark did not intend for Plaintiffs to rely upon the false 
statements contained therein, is rather baffling. The Purchase and Sale Agreement asked 
for, among other things, income and expense statements, an estoppel certificate, and an 
indemnification of the buyer. Exhibit 14 contains 9 pages, including an estoppel 
certificate, an income and expense statement, and an indemnification of buyer, all sent 
only 13 days after the Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed. Plaintiffs testified that 
they considered Exhibit 14 to be the Income and Expense Statement requested, was sent 
to them twice; and that they relied upon that statement heavily to their detriment. There 
was no evidence to the contrary. 
2. The evidence at trial clearly and convincingly showed that the 
fraudulent statements in the Estoppel Certificate and the Income and Expense 
Statements; together with the nondisclosure of the truth regarding these statements, 
were material to the transaction. 
Defendants confuse the issue of materiality. Fraudulent statements are 
material in this case to the extent they are "important in determining the choice of action" 
of the Plaintiffs. JrllY Instruction No. 35. A reasonable person would attach importance 
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to statements of rent payments in making a decision to purchase a leased property. See 
id. Any reasonable seller would likewise expect that a buyer would find such statements, 
and the lack of any clarifying truthful statements, extremely important. Id. 
Defendants argue that the Center's plans to consolidate operations made the 
promissory notes and nonpayment of rent immaterial. It is very hard to comprehend this 
logic. Promissory notes in lieu of payment of rent were highly material-regardless of 
the time period to which it related-and were made even more material by the fact that 
they flatly contradicted Defendants' own statements that rent had been paid. I The 
Center's plans to consolidate have no bearing on the fact that the Defendants lied about 
all rent being paid. Furthermore, evidence that the Center paid "millions of dollars in 
rent to High Mark and Arave-related entities" made material the non-disclosure of the 
Center's failure to pay rent for several months. The materiality of the fraudulent 
statements was enhanced by the truthful facts that were relayed to the Plaintiffs.2 
J Defendants incredulously continue to assert that the Center paid its rent "through executing promissory notes." 
This argument has never carried any weight. The Center's obligation to pay rent can only be defined in the context 
of the Lease Agreement: '''Monthly Rent' means $24,987.50 per calendar month[.]" "Lessee covenants to pay the 
Lessor the Monthly Rent ... in advance on or before the first day of each month during the TelTI1[.)" Plaintiff,' 
Exhibit 8. Given that there was no evidence the Center passed any money to Defendants when entering the 
promissory note agreements, and that nearly all of the money obligated as a result of the notes was never paid, the 
notes could have never, in any real sense, constitute the payment of rent. 
2 Citing Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 567, 97 P.3d 428 (2004), Defendants argue that the Court cannot 
consider Plaintiffs' statements at trial regarding the materiality of these matters. However, Karlson does not state 
that the Court can or should ignore the evidence. Plaintiffs' testimony regarding materiality was not offered to 
"refute" Defendants' case. Plaintiffs testified in their case in chief that would not have purchased the property if 
they had knO\vn that rent was not paid. There was no "conflicting evidence" regarding materiality. 
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3. There was no substantial evidence that the meeting between 
Matt Smith, Marc Weinpel and Scott Williams never occurred; in fact, the only 
evidence that was presented showed that the meeting did occur. 
Although Scott Williams may have denied a meeting between himself, Matt 
Smith and Marc Weinpel regarding the Center's intention to vacate the leased property, 
Scott Williams did not testify at trial. All the jury heard was from two separate, 
corroborating witnesses that Williams, an agent and representative of High Mark, was 
told prior to closing that the Center could not pay any rent. The best evidence of this 
meeting was that it OCCUlTed on or about October 15,2007, the time that Weinpel sent the 
same message in writing to Williams. Plaillt((fi" Exhibit 23. 
Whether or not the Center received a Notice to Quit really has no bearing 
on whether Williams was told in that October 2007 meeting that the Center was moving 
out of the building. This fact is further supported by the evidence that only about a week 
prior to meeting with Williams, Smith and Weinpel had signed a new lease to move to a 
building at 1975 Maliha Avenue. Defendants' Exhibit RRR. Furthermore, to assert that 
the Center only left the building because of the Notice to Quit clearly ignores the 
overwhelming facts that showed that the Center was not even attempting to make its rent 
payments due to financial difficulties, and had already contacted a bankruptcy attorney 
before it received the Notice to Quit. Plaint(ff's' Exhibit 34. 
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C. Damages. 
1. Brent Butikofer's testimony did not show failure to mitigate. 
Defendants argue that Brent Butikofer testified that the Plaintiffs should 
"demise" the property for smaller business owners to move in. This was not Butikofer's 
testimony. Butikofer testified that it is common for real estate brokers to make valuation 
decisions, and that he had determined that demising the property had the risk of 
alienating larger interested clients. Butikofer and the Plaintiffs had to make an initial 
determination as to whether demising the property was the best approach to securing 
another tenant. Butikofer did not testify that demising would be too costly; he simply 
stated that he had determined that it was not appropriate in order to best assist the 
Plaintiffs in recouping their losses. Plaintiffs did not waste any time in trying to get a 
new, paying tenant. Furthermore, no evidence was presented that the Plaintiffs received 
any offers from any tenants other than their current tenant, the Family Care Center. 
2. Plaintiffs' attempt to find a paying tenant was not a failure to 
mitigate damages. 
Defendants also presented at trial the incredible argument that the Plaintiffs 
should have tried to keep the Center in the property at 1675 Curlew. Overwhelming 
evidence was presented that at the time the Center received the Notice to Pay Rent or 
Quit, the Center could not pay any rent, had executed a promissory note in November of 
2007 in lieu of rent for October and November, had informed the Defendants they were 
in financial trouble, had contacted a bankmptcy attorney, had initiated efforts to 
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move its business. Under these circumstances, keeping the Center in the property for any 
extended period of time would have itself been a failure to mitigate damages. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not instantly seek to evict the Center, as 
suggested by Defendants. The Notice to Pay Rent or Quit asked for rent to be paid or 
eviction proceedings would commence. Plaint(ffs' Exhibit 35. The Center made no 
response, failed to pay the rent or any portion thereof and abandoned the property. 
Plaintiffs' dealings with the Center were abrupt, but their attempt to find a 
paying, stable tenant that could immediately fill the property was not a failure to mitigate 
damages. Contrary to Defendants' arguments, Plaintiffs showed substantial damages due 
directly to the Defendants' fraudulent statements regarding the Center. 
D. Motion for New Trial. 
1. There is nothing wrong with Plaintiffs asking for a new trial in 
the alternative based upon the same facts as its Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
Without citing any authority, Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs had to 
rehash the same factual discussion and argument for their Motion for a New Trial as they 
presented for the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Rule 59(a) only 
requires that the factual grounds be stated with patiicularity. Plaintiffs have provided 
ample factual grounds for a new trial. The rules do not forbid a party to combine these 
motions with one set of facts. See. e.g., Beco COllst. Co., Inc. v. Harper Contracting, 
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Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 936 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1997) (party asked for new trial in alternative 
to JNOV). 
2. The evidence clearly did not support the verdict. 
As stated previously, the jury was presented with significant evidence that 
High Mark knew about but did not disclose significant issues relating to the Center's 
failure to pay rent. The jury heard the Plaintiffs, one by one, state that they would not 
have purchased the property had they known these facts. The jury saw that the 
Defendants, including Gordon Arave, did nothing to disclose the lies in their 
representations. Scott Williams and Richard Armstrong, both agents of High Mark, knew 
significant information about the nonpayment of rent and promissory notes being signed, 
and did nothing to disclose it. The jury also heard evidence that the Plaintiffs worked 
hard to find a new tenant after they learned the previously-undisclosed tmth about the 
Center. 
Based upon the foregoing, it was quite baffling that the jury found for the 
Defendants on all counts. Plaintiffs asseli that a new trial would certainly bring about a 
new result. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court should grant Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. In the alternative, since the verdict is not 
supported by the evidence, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their Motion for a New 
Trial. 
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DATED this 14th day of May, 2010. 
By_~ __ ~~~~~~~~ __ __ 
Greg .! oett 
Attorn y ~' p~ntim 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY M'A ,HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC IL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and conect copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and conect 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this 14th day of May, 2010. 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONOHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 
a California corporation, ) MINUTE ENTRY 





HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLCj ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
==~~~~~==~~==~~~-------) HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLCi JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLC; ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 





THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., ) 
an Idaho corporation; THE IDAHO ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
) 
=T=Hc:::O-:-cM:-::-Ac:::S---:::O-o-'--:::S:-:cH;-;::E;-::A-a-n-d-;--::A;;-;:N-::-:N=E;::;----cD;:::-O;:::-N;-:;-O::::-H=U=E-) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 
a California corporation, ) 





THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; THE IDAHO ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC.; an ) 
Idaho corporation; MATTHEW F. ) 
SMITH, individually and as ) 
Statutory Trustee; DALE A. ) 
SCHNEIDER, individually, and as ) 
Statutory Trustee; and JOHN ) 
DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
On the 18th day of May, 2010, Plaintiffs' motion for verdict 
not withstanding the verdict or alternatively motion for new 
trial came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, 
in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick, 
Deputy Court Clerk, were present. 
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Mr. Sean Coletti appeared on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
Mr. Richard Armstrong appeared on behalf of Defendants High 
Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave. 
Mr. Crockett presented Plaintiffs' motion for verdict not 
withstanding the verdict or alternatively motion for new trial. 
Mr. Armstrong addressed the Court in opposition to the motion. 
Mr. Crockett presented rebuttal argument. 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue an 
opinion as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _18th_ day of May, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
PO Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
(Plaintiffs) 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Deputy Court Clerk 
(High Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT r .,' 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas and Anne 
O'Shea Trust u/d/t DATED NOVEMBER 2, 
1998; GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; CALEB 
FOOTE, an individual, KATE LARKIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High 
Mark Developmnet, LLC; JARED ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC; and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR JNOV OR NEW TRIAL 
I. FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
The general facts of this matter are as follows. Defendant High Mark 
Development, LLC (High Mark) owned a commercial real estate building located at 1675 
Curlew Drive, Ammon, Idaho (the Property). On June 20, 2006, High Mark entered into 
an agreement to lease the Property to The Children's Center, Inc. (the Center) for ten 
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years. The Center failed to pay rent for August 2006 through January 2007 due to 
financial difficulties. On April 18, 2007, Defendants Gordon and Jared Arave executed a 
promISSory note lending the Center $199,900.00. According to the terms of the 
promIssory note, the $199,900.00 represented $149,925.00 in "rent deferral" and 
$49,975.00 in "additional cash." The rent deferral equaled six months worth of rent; the 
same number of months the Center had failed to pay. The Center never repaid the April 
18, 2007 promissory note. 
In June 2007, High Mark listed the Property for sale. Plaintiff Tom O'Shea 
learned about the Property from Jeff Needs, a real estate agent in Boise, Idaho. On 
August 14, 2007, Plaintiff O'Shea Family Trust (the Trust) agreed to purchase the 
Property from High Mark. The Purchase and Sale Agreement called for High Mark to 
provide the Trust with certain documents concerning the Center, including the Center's 
2005 and 2006 tax returns and a current balance sheet. 
The Center failed to pay rent to High Mark for October, November and December 
2007. In lieu of paying October and November rent to High Mark, the Center signed a 
promissory note for two months worth of rent, which was never paid. 
The Purchase and Sale Agreement also required High Mark to deliver to the 
Trust, as a condition to closing, a Lease Estoppel Certificate (the CeIiificate) signed by 
the Center. The signed Certificate certified, inter alia, that: (1) other than the lease and 
the agreement to release the purchase option, no other agreements existed between the 
Center and High Mark affecting the Property; (2) all monthly rent had been paid through 
the end of September 2007; and (3) the Center was not in default under the lease. After 
the Center signed the Estoppel on October 18, 2007, High Mark delivered the Certificate 
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to Fife who, in turn, sent it to Plaintiffs. The sale closed in December 2007. The Center 
failed to pay any rent to the Trust. 
Plaintiffs initiated the present action alleging breach of contract, breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent 
nondisclosure. In prior rulings, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' breach of contract (Count 
1) and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count 2) claims as against 
the individual defendants. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for negligent 
concealment and negligent misrepresentation (Counts 3 and 4). The remaining claims 
consisted of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
as against High Mark (Counts 1 and 2), and actual fraud and constructive fraud (Counts 3 
and 4) as against all Defendants. On a subsequent motion for summary judgment, the 
Court found as a matter of law that Defendant High Mark breached the agreement by 
providing an estoppel certificate with false information. The COUli also ruled that the 
question of whether damages arose from that breach was an issue of fact for the jury. 
The trial began on March 1,2010 and continued to March 10,2010. Following 
the presentation of evidence, the Court dismissed the claims of fraud as against 
Defendant Jared Arave. All other issues were submitted to the jury with the jury returning 
a verdict in favor of Defendants on all claims brought by Plaintiffs. The Court thereafter 
entered a Judgment upon the jury's verdict dismissing Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
with prejudice. 
Currently before the Comi is Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or, Alternatively, Motion for New Trial. The Parties have fully briefed the issues 
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and the Court heard oral argument on May 18, 2010, before taking the matter under 
advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
Standard for JNOV 
In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the law 
provides that "a jury verdict must be upheld ifthere is evidence of sufficient quantity and 
probative value that reasonable minds could have reached a similar conclusion to that of 
the jury." Hall v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 313, 324, 179 P.3d 276,287 
(2008) (citing Gillingham Canst., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 15,20, 
121 P.3d 946, 951 (2005)). In reviewing a motion for JNOV, the court may not reweigh 
evidence, consider witness credibility, or compare its factual findings with that of the 
jury. Furthermore, the moving party admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every 
inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence. Schwan 's Sales Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dept., 142 Idaho 826, 830, 136 P.3d 297,301 (2006). 
Standard for New Trial 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) states that "[a] new trial may be granted to all 
or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for any of the following 
reasons ... (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against the law." A motion based upon subdivision 6 must "set forth the factual 
grounds therefore with particularity." I.R.C.P. 59(a). 
A trial judge may grant a new trial based on I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(6) where 
"after he has weighed all the evidence, including his own determination of 
the credibility of the witnesses, he concludes the verdict is not in accord 
with his assessment of the clear weight of the evidence." The trial court is 
given broad discretion in this ruling. The trial judge may set aside the 
verdict even though there is substantial evidence to suppOli it. In addition, 
DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
1415 
the trial judge is not required to view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict-winner. Addressing the considerable discretion 
given to the trial court in deciding motions for new trials, this COUli has 
said: 
"[t]he trial court may grant a new trial when it is satisfied the 
verdict is not supported by, or is contrary to, the evidence, or is 
convinced the verdict is not in accord with the clear weight of the 
evidence and that the ends of justice would be subserved by 
vacating it, or when the verdict is not in accord with either law or 
justice." 
Furthermore, "[i]f having given full respect to the jury's findings, the 
judge on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed, it is to be expected that he will grant a 
new trial." 
Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 568, 97 P.3d 428, 435 (2004) (internal citations 
omitted). 
III. ANAL YSIS 
Plaintiffs move the Court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, 
alternatively, for a new trial as to the following claims: (l) breach of contract; (2) actual 
fraud committed by High Mark; and (3) fraud by nondisclosure committed by High Mark 
and Gordon Arave. Plaintiffs do not contest the jury's verdict as it relates to Gordon 
Arave on the question of actual fraud. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not challenge the jury's 
verdict as it relates to Benjamin Arave, or the Court's directed verdict in favor of Jared 
Arave. 
Breach of Contract 
Plaintiffs allege that the jury's verdict in favor of High Mark on the breach of 
contract claim was not supported by substantial evidence. 
The Court previously ruled on summary judgment that High Mark breached the 
contract by providing false and misleading statements in the Estoppel Certificate. Thus, at 
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trial, Plaintiffs were only required to prove causation and damages to prevail on their 
breach of contract claim. The jury decided, however, that High Mark's breach of contract 
did not "proximately cause damages to Plaintiffs." Verdict Form, Question No. l. The 
issue presently before the Court is whether substantial evidence supported the jury's 
decision. 
The Parties respective burdens of proof are of course significant in considering 
such post trial motions. In this case, Plaintiff bore the burden of proving causation and 
damages by a preponderance of the evidence. It is the rare case where a court may grant a 
motion for JNOV brought by a party having the burden of proof where sufficiency of the 
evidence or credibility may be challenged. 
It is one thing to grant aj.n.o.v. against a person because he has not met 
his burden of proof. It is an entirely different matter, though, to grant a 
j.n.o.v. infavor C?fthe person with the burden of proof when the jury has 
found that person's witnesses were not credible. If the jury is the exclusive 
judge of credibility and the ultimate finder of fact, as they were instructed 
here, then how can a trial judge grant aj.n.o.v. in favor of a person having 
the burden of proof where the jury has rejected his evidence as not 
credible, as they did in this case? 
Harvey v. F-B Truck Line Co. 115 Idaho 411,427, 767 P.2d 254, 70 (987) Bakes, 1. 
dissenting. 
A jury's right to believe who they will is recognized in other jurisdictions as well: 
The burden was not on the defendant, but was on the plaintiff to make out 
the case stated in his petition. In a case where the allegations of the 
petition are denied by the answer, and the plaintiff offers oral evidence 
tending to support the allegations of the petition, the defendant is entitled 
to have the jury pass upon the credibility of such evidence even though he 
should offer no evidence himself. The court has no right to tell the jury 
that it must believe the witnesses. The jury, in the first instance, is the sole 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight and value of 
their evidence, and may believe or disbelieve the testimony of anyone or 
all of the witnesses, though such evidence be uncontradicted and 
unimpeached. 
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Cluck v. Abe, 328 Mo. 81, 84, 40 S.W.2d 558, 559 (1931 ) (citations omitted); see, also, 
A1cGrath v. Carson, 79 Ark. App. 269, 273, 86 S.W.3d 415, 417 (Ark. App. 2002). 
Similarly, a jury is given great deference to believe or disbelieve evidence as to 
causation: 
Thus, no matter how strong the evidence of a party, who has the burden of 
establishing negligence and proximate cause as facts, may comparatively 
seem to be, he is not entitled to have those facts declared to have reality as 
a matter of law, unless there is utterly no rational basis in the situation, 
testimonially, circumstantially, or inferentially, for a jury to believe 
otherwise. 
United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Milner Hotels, 253 F .2d 542, 547 (8th Cir. 1958). 
In the case at bar, Defendants presented the following evidence at trial contesting 
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim. First, Defendants put on evidence showing that they 
informed Plaintiffs prior to closing of the existence and purpose of the promissory notes 
and provided Plaintiffs with other documents revealing the true financial condition of the 
Children's Center. Paul Fife testified that he sent to Jeff Needs a copy of the Center's 
current balance sheet, which showed an outstanding loan from Gordon Arave in the 
amount of $187,929.40, as well as other significant liabilities. Fife also testified that he 
told Needs that a promissory note had been forgiven in exchange for the Center signing 
the Estoppel and releasing the Option. In addition, uncontroverted evidence at trial 
showed that Plaintiffs received the Center's 2005 and 2006 tax returns and 2007 profit 
and loss statement. Arguably, these financial documents disclosed that the Center was in 
financial trouble. In fact, Kate Donahue testified that, based on these documents, she 
viewed the Center's expenses as "heavy." 
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Second, Defendants elicited testimony from Plaintiffs regarding their motivation 
for purchasing the property. At least some of the Plaintiffs were seeking to defer capital 
gains tax from an earlier sale of commercial property by reinvesting the proceeds in 
similar property pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1031. Defendants' evidence arguably supported 
the theory that based on the time limit set forth in § 1031, Plaintiffs were committed to 
purchasing the propeliy and were not particularly concerned with the financial condition 
of the tenant. 
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the statements 
made in the Estoppel Certificate, while inaccurate, were not a proximate cause of 
damages because accurate information was disclosed elsewhere. I The jury could likewise 
have concluded that, by ignoring other disclosures showing financial difficulty, Plaintiffs 
were going to proceed with the purchase regardless of the information provided in the 
Estoppel in order to realize the tax benefits from a § 1031 like-kind exchange. While the 
Court may not necessarily agree with the jury verdict, the COUli does not have a "definite 
and firm conviction" that a mistake has been made. 
Plaintiff has also suggested that the jury did not understand and/or follow the jury 
instructions applicable to this matter and specifically, causation. However, the Court is 
required to presume that the jury fully understood and followed the given instructions: 
In conclusion, the jury instructions given by the district cOUli wholly, 
fairly and adequately raise the issues and state the applicable law. Silver 
Creek Computers, Inc., 136 Idaho at 882, 42 P.3d at 676. This Court may 
disagree with the ultimate result reached by the jury, but if the jury 
instructions wholly, fairly and adequately state the applicable law, "[t]his 
COUli must presume that the jury followed the jury instructions" in getting 
I This Court previously denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that issues 
of fact precluded a finding as a matter of law that that the inaccurate statements in the Estoppel Certificate 
proximately caused damages to Plaintiffs. 
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to their result. State v. Ransom, 137 Idaho 560, 566, 50 P.3d 1055, 1061 
(2002). 
Boll v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 334, 341, 92 P.3d 1081,1088 (2004). 
The school district in this case has made no affirmative showing that the 
jury went beyond the trial judge's instruction and improperly considered 
such elements as grief or mental anguish. In the absence of such a 
showing, and where the jury instructions are clear, an appellate court will 
presume that the jurors have heeded the instructions given by the trial 
court. Mattson v. Bryan. 92 Idaho 587,448 P.2d 201 (1968). 
Packardv. Joint School Dist. No. 171,104 Idaho 604, 612, 661 P.2d 770,778 
(App.,1983). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that substantial evidence suppOlied the 
jury's decision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to JNOV or a new trial on their 
breach of contract claim. 
Actual Fraud 
Again, the Parties' burdens of proof are significant. As to fraud, Plaintiff bore the 
burden of proving elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Plaintiffs' actual 
fraud claim against High Mark related to representations made in the Estoppel Certificate 
and elsewhere that the Center was current on rent and CAM payments. 
In order to succeed on their actual fraud claim against High Mark, Plaintiffs were 
required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, each of the following elements: 
(1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; 
(4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that 
there be reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; 
(7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. 
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007). 
Defendants presented evidence at trial wherefrom the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the false statements were not material, that Plaintiffs knew about the falsity 
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of the statements, that Plaintiffs did not rely on the false statements, that any reliance was 
not justifiable, or that there was no resultant injury. The Court finds that the jury's 
decision was supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
JNOV or a new trial on their actual fraud claim. 
Constructive Fraud 
To establish constructive fraud, Plaintiffs were required to prove, by clear and 
convincing evidence, the following eight elements: (1) one party was in possession of a 
vital fact; (2) there was nondisclosure of that fact to the other pmiy; (3) the nondisclosure 
was material; (4) the party claiming nondisclosure was unaware of the vital fact not 
disclosed; (5) the party failing to disclose knew that the other party did not know that 
fact; (6) there was reasonable reliance upon the nondisclosure; (7) the party suffered 
dan1ages proximately caused by the nondisclosure; and (8) the nature and extent of the 
damages to that party, and the amount thereof. See, Watts v. Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 
P.2d 387 (1998). 
Defendants presented evidence at trial showing that the promissory notes were 
disclosed and that other documents were provided showing the Center's financial 
problems. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the alleged 
undisclosed information regarding the Center's financial condition was not so vital, 
material, and unknown by Plaintiffs that it should have been timely disclosed by 
Defendants. Additionally, the jury could have concluded that no damages arose from the 
alleged constructive fraud. The Court finds that substantial evidence supported the jury's 
decision. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not entitled to JNOV or a new trial on their 
constructive fraud claim. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict or, Alternatively, Motion for New Trial is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this'~ day of May, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ day of May, 2010, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard 1. Armstrong 
Brinton M. Wilkins 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
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Plaintiffs, Case No. CV-2008-4025 
-vs.- MINUTE ENTRY 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC. 
et aI. 
Defendants. 
June 23, 2010, Defendants Motion for Costs and Fees came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, sitting in open cOUli at Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy COUli Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Gregory Crockett appeared on behalf of the plaintiff's. 
Mr. Richard Almstrong appeared on behalf of defendants. 
Mr. Armstrong addressed the Court in suppOli of the motion and costs requested be 
granted. 
Mr. Crockett responded in objection that the fees and costs are excessive. 
Mr. Amlstrong offered rebuttal argument and objected to counsel's argument. 
MINUTE ENTRY - I 
The Court took this matter under advisement and would issue its opinion and decision. 
Comi was thus adjourned. 
c: Greg Crockett 
Richard An11strong 
062310Al\1Tingey Courtroom #3 
MINlITE ENTRY - 2 
District Judge 
142.4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISrlije:.jUL - 2 At1 9: 04 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNE15~Js.~~1 C UK 
GIS TR AT DI V ISI011 
It J >~:~,. y 
IDAHO 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA. Trustees of the Thomas and Anne 
O'Shea Trust uld/t DATED NOVEMBER 2, 
1998: GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; CALEB 
FOOTE, an individual, KATE LARKIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., a 
California corporation, 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High 
Mark Developmnet. LLC; JARED ARAVE, 
individually and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High Mark 
Development. LLC; and JOLIN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
This matter has come before the Court upon Defendants' motion for costs and 
attorney fees as against Plaintiffs. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants seek an award of costs pursuant to Rule 54, LR.C.P. and an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-120(3). Section 12-120(3) allows for an award of 
attorney fees in actions "to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bilL 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, 
wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction ... ". 
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Defendants also seek an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to the subject 
purchase agreement which allows for such costs and fees to the prevailing party in a legal 
action. 
In considering a motion for costs and fees, the Court is granted broad discretion in 
determining a prevailing party. Rule 54(d)(1)(B) provides as follows: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and 
entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the 
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine 
that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part and 
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in 
a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
1. COSTS 
The Comi has considered the claims made in this matter, the progress of the 
litigation, and the ultimate outcome. The Court finds that Defendants are the prevailing 
parties in this matter and are entitled to an award of costs as a matter of right (Rule 
54(d)(l)(C)) in the amount of$7,582.59. 
2. ATTORNEY FEES - HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC 
Defendant High Mark argues that Plaintiffs' claim against it was based on a 
contract and commercial transaction and therefore, attorney fees under § 12-120(3) are 
required. The Court agrees. Again, High Mark was the prevailing party in this matter 
and an award of attorney fees is required under § 12-120(3) as well as the purchase 
agreement. While Plaintiffs also pursued fraud claims against High Mark, the gravamen 
of the lawsuit against High Mark was the contract and corresponding commercial 
transaction. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 152 P.3d 594, 143 Idaho 723 (2007); 
Dennet v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (1997); Cox v. Clayton, 137 Idaho 492, 50 
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PJd 987 (2002); In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 199 
PJd 102 (2008); Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 708, 8 P.3d 1245, 1251 (2000). 
Accordingly, High Mark is entitled to an award of attorney fees in defending this action. 
3. ATTORNEY FEES - INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
The individual defendants seek attorney fees under § 12-120(3) based on the contract 
between Plaintiffs and High Mark and the commercial transaction involving the purchase of the 
property. As reflected in the record, Plaintiffs pursued breach of contract claims against the 
individual defendants. Those claims were however dismissed relatively early in the litigation. I 
Accordingly, the claims against the individual defendants at the time of trial were limited to 
alleged fraud. 
Pursuant to § 12-120, the individual defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees 
incurred in defending against the claim for breach of contract. Attorney fees incurred after the 
dismissal of the contract claims however are not recoverable. 
I.C. § 12-120(3) compels an award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in any civil action to recover on a contract for services or "in any 
commercial transaction." I.C. § 12-120(3). When this action was initiated, 
BECO asserted a breach of contract claim against J-U-B and that claim was 
litigated until August 15,2005, when BECO dismissed the claim. BECO 
asserts that, at most, J-U-B is entitled to recover the $33,661.92 in fees that 
were incurred to this point in defending the action. However, BECO asserts 
there was neither a contract claim nor a commercial transaction that would 
support a fee award under I.e. § 12-120(3) after that point in the litigation. 
A "commercial transaction" is defined in Section 12-120(3) as "all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." Id. An 
award of attorney fees under this section is proper "if the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the 
party is attempting to recover." Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLe, 143 
Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594,599 (2007) (quoting Brower v. E.1. DuPont 
De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P.2d 345,349 (1990». 
BECO claims there was no commercial transaction between these parties. 
1 A claim of negligent misrepresentation was also dismissed early in the litigation. 
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The case at bar clearly involved a "commercial transaction" within the 
meaning ofI.C. § 12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and 
BECO and not between J-U-B and BECO. J-U-B was acting as the City's 
agent in the transaction but there was no commercial relationship between 
J-U-B and BECO. Therefore. I.C. § 12-120(3) does not provide the basis 
for a fee award to J-U-B after the point where the contractual claim was 
dismissed. Up to that point, J-U-B is entitled to its fees for defending 
against the contract claim. After that point J-U-B is not entitled to its fees 
because there is no commercial transaction between the parties. The fact 
that J-U-B may have been the City'S agent is not sufficient to establish an 
independent commercial transaction between J-U-B and BECO. We 
therefore vacate the fee award and remand this case for determination and 
award of the amount of fees J-U-B incurred defending BECO's contract 
claim. 
BECO Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 844, 
851 (2008) (emphasis added); See also Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLe. 141 Idaho 16. 
32. 105 P.3d 676. 692 (2005). 
In this case, the individual defendants were not pm1ies to the purchase agreement 
or commercial transaction. The individual defendants are therefore entitled to attorney 
fees incurred in defending against the contract claims, but are not entitled to attorney fees 
incurred once the contract claims were dismissed. 
4. AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES 
The Court has reviewed the record and Defendants' memorandum of fees and 
costs and the affidavit filed in support. The Court has further considered the factors set 
out in Rule 54(e)(3), I.R.C.P., including but not limited to the time required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the case, prevailing rates for attorney fees, the amount in dispute, and 
duplication of effort. 
As set out above, the claim for attorney fees is to be discounted inasmuch as the 
individual defendants are not entitled to recover fees incurred in defending against the 
fraud claims. Furthermore, it is appropriate to discount the claim based upon pre-trial 
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motions in which the Defendants did not prevail. For example, one significant issue 
related to evidence as to the "due diligence" of the Plaintiffs in investigating the purchase 
and the financial condition of the tenant. The Court repeatedly held that Plaintiffs' 
proffered evidence as to the alleged lack of due diligence was not admissible. 
Additionally, the claim will be discounted for travel time. While the Court does 
not fault or condemn Defendants for utilizing counsel from Salt Lake City, Defendants 
did so knowing that additional fees would be incurred for necessary travel time. The 
Court finds it appropriate to consider this factor in the award of attorney fees. 
The record also reflects fees incurred in pursuing claims against the Children's 
Center, which was a third party defendant in this action. Those fees are not awardable 
against PlaintifIs. 
In consideration of the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to 
an award of attorney fees in the amount of $87,200. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record and the foregoing analysis, Defendants' motion for costs and 
fees is granted. Defendants are awarded costs in the amount of $7,582.59, and attorney 
fees in the amount of $87,200, for a total amount of $94,782.59. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this __ day ofJuly, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thi~ day of July, 2010, I did send a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean 1. Coletti 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard J. Armstrong 
Brinton M. Wilkins 
WOOD CRAPO, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, DT 84111 
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O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas and Anne 
O'Shea Trust u/d/t DATED NOVEMBER 2, 
1998: GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; CALEB 
FOOTE, an individual, KATE LARKIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOl-IN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 




H[GH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High 
Mark Developmnet, LLC; JARED ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC; and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendants. 
A DIS R I 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
JUDGMENT OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The Court having previously entered its Order granting Defendants' motion for 
costs and attorney fees, and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants have judtment 
against Plaintiffs for costs in the amount of $7,582.59, and attorney fees in the amount of 
$87,200, for a total amount of $94,782.59. 
Dated this day of July, 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California corporation; 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, indIvidually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Fee Category: IAR 23 ( a) 
Fee: $101.00 
1433 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, High Mark Development, LLC, 
Gordon Arave, Jared Arave, and Benjamin Arave, and THE PARTIES 
ATTORNEY, Richard J. Armstrong, Esq., and the CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Thomas O'Shea and Anne Donahue 
O'Shea, Grandview Credit, LLC, Caleb Foote, Kate Larkin Donahue, John Kevin 
Donahue and San Francisco Residence Club, Inc. (hereinafter "Appellants"), appeal 
against the above named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final 
judgment, including the following Orders made and entered in the above entitled action, 
the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding: 
A. Decision and Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, dated 
May 28, 2010; 
B.Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment, dated January 14,2010. 
2. That the Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court and the judgments or orders described in Paragraph I above are appealable orders 
under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1) and Rule 17(e)(1)(A) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
This appeal is taken upon matters of law and upon matters of fact. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants 
intend to assert; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the 
appellants from asserting other and additional issues, is as follows: 
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A. Did the District Court err in denying the Appellants' Motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, made pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 50(b)? 
B. Did the District Court eIT in denying the Appellants a New 
Motion for Trial made pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)? 
C. Did the District Court err as a matter of law in denying the 
Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment made pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 56? 
4. That no order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. That Appellants request the preparation of a reporter's standard 
transcript as defined in the Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 25( c), in both hard copy and 
electronic format, supplemented by the following: 
A. The conference on requested instructions, the objections of 
the parties to the instmctions, and the Court's ruling thereon, heard by the Honorable Joel 
E. Tingey, District Judge, on March 9,2010. 
B. The hearing on the parties' Cross Motions for Sununary 
Judgment, heard by the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge on December 22,2009. 
C. The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or alternatively Motion for New Trial, heard by the 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, on May 18, 2010. 
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6. That Appellants request the following documents to be included in 
the clerk's record in addition to those documents automatically included under Idaho 
appellate Rules, Rule 28: 
A. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, submitted 
on November 13,2009; 
B. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, submitted on November 13,2009; 
C. Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Pat1ial 
Summary Judgment, submitted on November 13,2009; 
D. Affidavit of Jeff Needs, submitted on November 13, 2009; 
E. Affidavit of Sean 1. Coletti, submitted on November 13,2009; 
F. Affidavit of Marc J. Weinpel, submitted on November 18,2009; 
O. Plaintiffs' Objection to Defendants' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment / Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Pat1ial SUlmnary 
Judgment, submitted on December 15, 2009; 
H. Second Affidavit of Sean 1. Coletti, submitted on December 
15,2009; 
1. Statement of Facts in Opposition to Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, submitted on December 15, 2009; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 1436 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order on Motions for Summary 
Judgment, dated January 14,2010; 
K. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, 
Alternatively, Motion for New Trial, submitted on March 22, 20 I 0; 
L. Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, or, Altematively, for New Trial, submitted on March 22, 2010; 
M. Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or, Altematively, for New Trial, submitted on May 17, 
2010; 
N. Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, submitted on February 
11,20lO; 
O. Plaintiffs' First Supplement to Proposed Jury Instructions, 
submitted on February 22,2010; 
May 28, 20 I O. 
7. 
P. Decision and Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, dated 
The Appellants request the following documents, charts, or pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme COUli: 
A. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 - RE-23 Commercial/Investment Real 
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement; 
B. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8 - Lease Agreement; 
C. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 - April 18,2007 Promissory Note; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 1437 
D. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 14 - Fax from Paul Fife to Jeff Needs; 
E. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 - Fax from Gordon Arave to Matt Smith; 
F. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 20 - High Mark fax sent to Tom O'Shea; 
G. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 24 - October 17,2007 Agreement; 
H. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 25 -- October 18, 2007 Lease Estoppel 
Certificate; 
1. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29 - Email from Armstrong to Weinpel, 
and November 7,2007 Promissory Note; 
J. Plaintiff,;' Exhibit 39 - All Payments From The Children's 
Center to High Mark Development; 
K. Defendants' Exhibit N - Balance Sheet. 
8. I certify: 
A. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each 




605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
B. That the Clerk of the District Court or has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the Reporter's transcript. 
C. That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's 
Record has been paid. 
1438 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6 
D. That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
E. That service has been made upon all parties required to be 
served pursuant to Rule 20, Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED THIS _11!:day of July, 2010. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT 
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
By~f7fJr~ 
c. Timothy Hopkins 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY, 
FACSIMILE OR ELECTRONIC MAIL TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their 
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, telecopying or emailing to them a true and COlTect 
copy of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile or email transmission. 
DATED this ~~{/~day of July, 2010. 
Richard J. Armstrong, Esq. 
Wood Crapo, LLC 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Email: L@.nnstrol1g(Z~woodcrapo.com 
Hon. Joel E. Tingey 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Jack Fuller 
Court Reporter 
605 N. Capital Ave. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8 
Sea J. Coletti 
• U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivery 
0 Facsimile 
0 Email 
0 U.S. Mail 
• Hand Delivery 
0 Facsimile 
0 Email 
0 U.S. Mail 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, 
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Docket No. 31g&1 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Case number from Court: CV 2008-4025 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Decision and Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, entered 5-28-
10 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions For Summary Judgment, entered 1-14-10 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
C.Timothy Hopkin 
Richard Armstrong 
Thomas O'Shea and Anne Donahue O'Shea 
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Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated: July 14,2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 
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IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT arurnllf ,r:PPEl.t.S 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVIIliJiJ AUG 12 A 10: 3'1 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust uJd/t 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, 
LLC, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
DefendantlRespondents. 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust uJd/t 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 
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i:r.terea GPATS bY' ppeals_ 
DALE A. SCHNEIDER, an individual; ) 
MATTHEW F. SMITH, an individual; THE ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation and THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Appeal from: Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County 
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding. 
Case number from Court: CV 2008-4025 
Order or Judgment appealed from: Decision and Order on Motion for JNOV or New Trial, entered 5-28-
10 and Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions For Summary Judgment, entered 1-14-10 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed by: 
Appealed against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Was District Court Reporter's Transcript requested? 
If so, name of reporter: 
Dated: August 10,2010 
C.Timothy Hopkins 
Richard Armstrong 
Thomas O'Shea and Anne Donahue O'Shea 






Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 1444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL RJS~%;I3r OF THE :) 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONOHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998i ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individuali KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individuali JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN) ORDER TO DEPOSIT FUNDS IN AN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC.,) INTEREST BEARING ACCOUNT 
a California corporation, ) 





HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLC; ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
~~~~~--==~~-===~~=---~--) HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company;) 
GORDON ARAVE, individually and ) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLCi JARED ARAVE, ) 
individually and as Member of ) 
High Mark Development, LLC; ) 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, Individually and) 
as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, and ) 
JOHN DOES I-X, ) 
) 





THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., ) 
an Idaho corporation; THE IDAHO ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
) 
==T=H--=O-c-MA=-::S=--=O::-:':-:S=HC:::E=-A==---a-n"dC--::AN--=-=-N=E=--=D=-O=NC=-O=H=U=E:--- ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas ) 
and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t ) 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; ) 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability ) 
company; CALEB FOOTE, an ) 
individual; KATE LARKIN DONOHUE,) 
an Individual; JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONOHUE, an Individual; and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., ) 
a California corporation, ) 





THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation; THE IDAHO ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC.; an ) 
Idaho corporation; MATTHEW F. ) 
SMITH, individually and as ) 
Statutory Trustee; DALE A. ) 
SCHNEIDER, individually, and as ) 
Statutory Trustee; and JOHN ) 
DOES I-X, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that check number 055911 in the amount 
of $129,904.32 be placed in an interest bearing account. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _31st_ day of August, 2010, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to 
be delivered to the following: 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean J. Coletti 
PO Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
(Plaintiffs) 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple, Ste. 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
RONALD LONGMORE 
(High Mark Development, Gordon Arave, Ben Arave and Jared Arave) 
1447 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California limited liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DON AI-IUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, 
INC., a California corporation; 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company; GORDON ARA VE, 
individually and as Member of High 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED 
ARA VE, individually and as Member 
of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARAVE, individually 
and as Member of High Mark 
Development, LLC, and JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendants-Res ondents. 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION 
AND RELEASING JUDGMENT 
LIENS 
THIS CAUSE came on regularly before the Court pursuant to the Plaintiffs-
Appellants' Application for Stay of Execution and Motion for Release of Judgment Liens, 
on Tuesday, August 31, 2010, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey presiding. Having reviewed 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AND RELEASING JUDGMENT LIENS - 1 
1448 
the Application and being apprised that an appropriate cash deposit has been posted by 
the Plaintiffs-Appellants, and good cause appearing therefore and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Application for Stay of Execution is 
GRANTED. Execution on the July 2,2010 Judgment shall be and is hereby stayed until 
further notice. 
2. Plaintiffs-Appellants' Motion for Release of Judgment Liens is 
GRANTED. Any liens imposed by Defendants-Respondents for the purpose of collecting 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AND RELEASING JUDGMENT LIENS - 2 
1449 
CERTIFICATE OF ENTRY 
I, the undersigned and Clerk of the above-entitled court, hereby certify that 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d), a copy of the foregoing was duly posted 
by first class mail to the defendant's and to plaintiffs counsel at the names and addresses 
stated below. 
DATED this __ -'-__ day of __ ~-"Y-:1-\.llL"""--'=---' 2010. 
RONALD LONGMORE, CLERK 
By '-rlvi< 
Deputy Clerk 
C. Timothy Hopkins, Esq. 0 U.S. Mail 
Hopkins Roden Crockett • Courthouse Box 
ltansen & Hoopes, PLLC 0 Hand Delivery 
428 Park Avenue 0 Facsimile 
P. O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Richard J. Annstrong, Esq. • U.S. Mail 
Wood Crapo LLC 0 Overnight Delivery 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 0 Hand Delivery 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 0 Facsimile 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AND RELEASING JUDGMENT LIENS - 3 
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I lZ, ~ Mark O'Shea BOl 366 6061 09/0 o 14:2B 1tB72 P.002/005 
I~W 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Richard 1. Armstrong, ISBN 5548 
Brinton M. Wilkins, pro hac vice 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
Attorneys for Defendants 
70 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
~~~_~~_~ ____ ~ ____ ~_~~~_~ ______ ~~~~ STATE OF~IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
) 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE ) 
O'SHEA, Trustees of the Thomas and Anne ) 
O'Shea Trust uJd/t DATED NOVEMBER 2, ) 
1998; GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a ) 
California limited liability company; CALEB ) 
FOOT, an individual, KATE LARKIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHN KEVIN ) 
DONAHUE, an individual, and SAN ) 
FRANCISCO RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., a ) 






mGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 





DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
Case No. CV-08-4025 
Judge Joel Tingey 
20 
From:High Mark O'Shea 801 3BB BOB1 o 14:28 11872 P.003/005 
) 
HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company; GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as Member of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC; JARED ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC; BENJAMIN D. ARA VE, ) 
individually and as Member of High Mark ) 
Development, LLC, ) 
) 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
-v.- -""- -----"-----"-"------------------"-- ) 
) 
THE CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
corporation; THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Third-Party Defendants. ) 
Pursuant to Idaho R. App. P. 19(a), DefendantslRespondents High Mark 
Development, LLC, Gordon Arave, Jared Arave, and Benjamin Arave, hereby request the 
following materials be added to the clerk's record on appeal, and which were omitted from 
PlaintiffslRespondents' request: 
1. Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted on 
November 27,2009. 
2. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted on November 27, 2009. 
3. Statement of Facts in Support of Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted on November 27, 2009. 
4. Mfidavit of Richard 1. Armstrong submitted on November 27,2009. 
2 
1452 
From:High NarK O'Shea 801 388 8081 o 14:28 #812 P.004/005 
5. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment submitted on December 16, 2009. 
6. Statement of Facts in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment submitted on December 16, 2009. 
7. Supplemental Affidavit of Richard J. Armstrong submitted on December 
16,2009. 
~~8. .Memorandum in Opposition to Motionior JudgmentNotwithstandingJhe 
Verdict, or, Alternatively, for New Trial, submitted on May 11,2010. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 2010. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
3 
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From:High Mark O'Shea 801 388 8081 o 14:28 #812 P.005/005 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the pi day of September, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD ON 
APPEAL was served via email to the following: 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Timothy Hopkins 
Sean J. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
. ___ .P.o.Box51219_.~_._. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
S.\WPDA TA\PU!ADING\lUGII MAJU(.O'SHl!A1lEQUEST FOlI. ADnmoNAL Jtl!CORD MATI!RlALS.wpd 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust uld/t 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, 
LLC, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees ofthe 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/dlt 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 
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DALE A. SCHNEIDER, an individual; ) 
MATTHEW F. SMITH, an individual; THE ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation and THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District ofthe State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for 
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its 
determination: Please see attached page(s) 
Index of Exhibits, no date 
Published Depositions not included. 
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on 
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court 
r'::/ 
thisg3 day of September, 2010. 
~/ 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS - 2 
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O'SHEA, et al. vs. HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY CASE NO. CV-08-402S 
PLAINTIFF'S INDEX OF EXHIBITS 
Plaintiffs' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
/, 1 Amendment to Operating Agreement of High 
/ Mark Development and other related Secretary V of State filings, 6/23/2006 
II 2 RE-10 Exclusive Seller Representation vi 
'0 Dvi'Y'v!:- tV;? Agreement between Paul Fife and High Mark V 
\ ",en r' R: ~ Development and signed by Gordon Arave, I L/ '-' 
6/4/2007 I o {,tJ 0 
I 3 Email correspondence from Paul Fife to Jeff V Needs and 1 photo, 8/6/07 V 
y 
4 Loop Net Ad, 8/712007 / / 
, 
5 Purchase and Sale Agreement, 819/2007 'v V 
, 
6 Idaho Children's Center, Inc. Website Screen 
Images \./ V 
/ 7 Email correspondence from Paul Fife to Jeff / Needs and 6 photos, 8/7107 t/ 
£/ 8 Lease Agreement signed by Gordon Arave and /' ~ Matthew Srnith on 6/26/2006 V 
9 Arave Construction Company, Inc. fax to The 
,~ V Children's Center, Re: Request for financial 
documentation, 1/26/2007 
10 Promissory Note payable to Gordon Arave and 
signed by Matthew Smith in the amount of 
$100,000, 611 12005 
fti:vrv L fk·~1 Vi / 
II Promissory Note payable to Gordon Arave and 
signed by Matthew Smith in the amount of 
$100,000, 10/1/2005 
12 Promissory Note payable to Gordon Arave and 
Jared Arave and signed by Matthew Smith, 
V V Jared Arave and Gordon Arave in the amount of 
$199,900, 4/18/2007 
13 Email correspondence between Richard t/ J Armstrong and Marc Weinpel, 8/27120RJIIIIIII/f1 
\\\\ 11//, 
~" ~~':::JIU :::'i ~ 0" ......... -- fA,':/ S ........ ~'JlS' •••. ~- .'" , :::: : ~\.) ~ '. /' ~:,.\. ,l:> 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
! 14 Paul Fife fax to Jeff Needs with four J 
attachments, 8/27/2007 V V 
.- 15 Gordon Arave fax letter to Matthew Smith, V V 411812007 
F 
16 The Children's Center tax returns and B/S, 
8/28/2007 fTc; fJLD d i Pi ~d V 1/ 
17 Jeff Needs Financial Analysis of The Children's V V Center cash flow 
18 Email correspondence between Richard 
V Armstrong and Marc Weinpel, Re: Estoppel V 
Certificate, 9/17/2007 
19 Richard Annstrong fax letter to Marc Weinpel, 'V" V' Re: Pocatello and Idaho Falls Leases, 9118/2007 
20 Arave Construction fax to Fife's Fax No., ~ ~. 9/18/2007 
, 
21 Email correspondence, Richard Armstrong to 
Marc Weinpel, Re: Pocatello and Idaho Falls V ~ 
Leases, 9/20/2007 
,- 22 Arave Construction Company, Inc. fax and 
letter from Scott Williams, Re: September and V V 
October payments, 10/2/2007 
. .' 23 Memo to Scott Williams from Tara 
Hanson/Marc Weinpel, Re: Pocatello LeaselIF t/ ~ 
Lease, unable to pay High Mark, 10115/2007 
24 Agreement signed by Jared Arave and Gordon V ~ Arave, 10118/2007 
~ 
/ 
25 Lease Estoppel Certificate, 10117/2007 with 
10118/2007 signature page V v/ 
26 Addendum No.4 to Purchase and Sale 
Agreement signed by Gordon Arave, 
10/24/2007 
I 27 Email correspondence between Richard 
Annstrong and Marc Weinpel, Re: Lease Issues, V t/ 
10/24/2007 
28 Email correspondence between Richard / Armstrong and Marc Weinpel, Re: October V 
2007 Rent, 11/5/2007 
2 
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Plaintiffs' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
" 29 Email correspondence fro111 Richard Annstrong 
to Marc Weinpel, Re: Rent Obligation and vi attached Promissory Note payable to High Mark V Development and signed by The Children'S 
Center (Matt Smith) in the amount of $57,975, 
11/7/2007 
Y 30 Consent to Transfer and Assumption signed by 
Gordon i\rave and Benjamin Arave, $23,000 t/ t/ assumption fee, 11114/2007 
,/ 31 Email correspondence, Richard Annstrong to V V Marc Weinpel, Re: Pocatello Rent, 11126/2007 
32 Settlement Statement, 12/7/2007 V ~ 
, 33 Email correspondence, Richard Armstrong to 
Marc Weinpel, Re: Sale ofIF building and V t/ amounts due on Pocatello building, 12/12/2007 
34 Email correspondence, Marc Weinpel to 
Richard Armstrong, Re: financial setback, t/ V 
1117/2008 
,,,.-
35 Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, 1124/2008 v V 
36 Marc Weinpelletter to leffNeeds, Re: The 
Children's Center vacating premises, V /' 02/26/2008 
37 Email correspondence, Marc Weinpel to Greg 
Crockett, Re: Lease payments made, 5/30/2008 
I 38 Scott Williams fax letter to The Children's i/ V Center, 1019/2007 
~v 39 Check and financial transaction records for The 
\ "21 pt:J on~1 
Children's Center and M, Smith Enterprises - / (/' 
2005 through 2007 
/ 40 J Letter to Marc Weinpel from Richard 
Annstrong and attached Promissory Notes (2), V V 
12112/2007 
- 41 Warranty Deed signed by Benj amin Arave and V t/ Gordon Arave, 12112/2007 
42 The Children's Center - 2008 Budget 




Plain tiffs' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
44 High Mark Development, LLC, Rent Roll for v The Children's Center Lease signed by Ben V 1./ 
Arave, April and November 2007 
,/ 45 Standard Insurance Company from High Mark 
Development, LLC, Borrower Warranty Letter, \-/ /~ v 
5/30/2006 
46 lack Chillemi spreadsheets re: damages 
/ 47 David M. Smith, CPA Expert Witness Report, vi' V , Ii 1017/2009 d »/n1A~~Li~AI ~~ /D (r'V£rA 
~/ 48 i David M. Smith, CPA 'CurriculupVitae V' / V I 
49 David M. Smith, CPA, Exhibits to Expert 
I ~f V () 3JI1-~~/)~C'c Witness Report CU) (rwt~ V 
.-
fU 
50 I d Fax letter to Rick Armstrong from Marc (/ 
/ 
Weinpel, re: offer to relinquish option to 
V ~ purchase on both properties in return for 
cancellation of "$200,000" promissory note, 
10/16/2007 
51 Fax letter to Marc Weinpel from Rick 
/ Annstrong, re: Estoppel Certificate negotiations 
and counteroffer: High Mark will release half of 
1/ V $200,000 note; CC pays overdue Oct. 07 rent; 
makes all due interest payments on 4/18/07 and 
1011 lOS notes - effort to "loosen financial 
burdens" of CC, 10116/2007 
52 Fax to leffNeeds from Paul Fife, re: property 
V tax assessment; stating deficit balances on IF V 
building total $26,221.22, 11126/2007 
53 Letter to Matt Smith from Gordon Arave with 
,; 
enclosed property tax assessment on 1675 IV ~ 
Curlew Drive, Ammon, 11/27/2007 
,/ 54 Lease Agreement between O'Shea and Family V ~ Care Center, Inc., 10/6/2008 
/ 55 Second Amendment to Lease between O'Shea V· V' and Family Care Center, Inc., 1212009 
56 Letter to Marc Weinpel from Rick Armstrong, 
re: Sale of Idaho Falls Building to O'Shea Vvl'f~d It vtAlJV) Family Trust, 12/12/2007 
./' 57 Chart showing amounts due on both Pocatello i/ V and Idaho Falls CC buildings, 11127/2007 
1460 4 
Plaintiffs' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
v 58 Financial Analysis for Family Care Center i,r/ 1/ prepared by Brent Butikofer 
59 Email correspondence between Ben Arave and 
/ John Gottschall Re: Second Addendum to the j;/ L/ .. 
Lease, 10/23/2007 
60 Fax from Ben Arave to John Gottschall, V IJe; 10/24/2007 
lillY exhibit used by the Defendants 
1461 5 
\VOOD CP\...L..PO LLC 
Richard 1. i'\.Imstrong. ISBN 5548 
Brinton M. Wilkins, (Admitled Pro Hac Vice) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Facsimile: (801) 366-6061 
An orneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE DONAHUE 
O'SHEA. Trustees of the Thomas and Anne 
O'Shea Trust u/d/t DATED NOVEMBER 2, 
1998:. GKA.NDVIEW CREDIT LLC, a 
California limited liability company; CALEB 
FOOT, an individual, KATE LARKIN 
DONAHUE, an individual, JOHJ'J KEVIN 
DONAHUE, an individuaL and SAN 




















HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC. an ) 
Idaho limited liability company: GORDON ) 
ARA VE, individually and as OfEeer of High ) 
Mark Development, LLC: BENJAMIN D. ) 
AM VE, individually and as OffIcer of High) 
Mark Development ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF EXl-!IBITS-J 1462 
DEFENDANTS'THIRD 
AMENDED LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Case No. CV -08-4025 
Judge Tingey 
Pursuant to paragraph ILl of the Court's Amended Order and Notice Setring Jury 
Trial, Defendants High Mark Development LLC Gordon Arave, Benjamin D. Arave, and Jared 
Arave. by and through their counsel of record, hereby submit their list of exhibits, listed by 
alphabetical letter: 
Defendants' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
A. Plaintiffs' Firsl Amended Verified Camplaim filed ;Va October 1. 2008 
B. June 19.2006 Lease Agreement between High 
Mark Development, LLC and the Children's 
Center, Inc. 
e June 4. 2007 Exclusive Seller Representation 
Agreement between High Mark Development, 
LLC and Paul Fife of High Desert Realtors 
D. I LoopNet Ad \ I 
August 7, 2007 Letter oflntent to Purchase from 
.TeffNeeds to Paul Fife 
F. August 9, 2007 Email from K..ristoffer Lynds to 
Jeff Needs 
G. August 14,2007 Commercialllnvestment Real 
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement and All 
Addenda 
H. August 23, 2007 Email from .IeffNeeds to Tom 
O'Shea 





• J. Buyers' Contributions to Purchase Price Sheet I V t/ 
K. 2005 Federal Tax Returns of the Children's 
Center, Inc. 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF E;(HIBITS-2 1463 
Defendants' Description Stip. Offered I Admit 
Exhibit No. , 
L. 2006 Federal Tax Retums of the Children's 
Center, Inc, 
l/, 1\1, Profit and Loss Statement of the Children' s V- I V "\~:.t v+
J 
I 0 F Center. Inc, from January 1 through June 7, 2007 If') 
} N, Balance Sheet of the Children's Center. Inc. as of v' V August 28,2007 
O. June L 2005 Promissory Note I I 
p, October 1, 2005 Promissory Note I 
Q. May 30,2006 Tenant Estoppel Certificate from 
StanCorp Mortgage Investors, LLC 
R. I April 18, 2007 Promissory Note 
S, August 9, 2007 Email from Kristoffer Lynds to 
leffNeeds 
T, August 28,2007 Letter from Richard Armstrong 
V t/ " to Paul Fife 
U September 27, 2007 FedEx Invoice, bates-labeled 
HM001014 
\1, September 6, 2007 Fax from Jeff Needs to Paul 
Fife and attachment 
W, September 14,2007 Email from leffNeeds to 
Tom O'Shea and Attaclunents of Tenanfs Tax 
Returns and 1effNeeds' fmancial model 
l./ 
X, The Children' s Center Financial S ununary 
prepared by 1effNeeds 
V V 
y, September 18,2007 Letter from Richard 
Annstrong to Marc Weinpel 
V 
\ September 20, 2007 Lease Estoppel CertifIcate 
\ \ 
V \ V ./ Z. 
DEFENDANTS' LIST OF EXHIBfTS-3 1464 
I 
Defendants' Description Stip. Offered Admit I 
Exhibit No. 
,V-
AA. September 21, 2007 Fax from Jeff Needs to Paul V t/ 
Fife and attachment 
,/ BE. I September 24, 2007 Lease Estoppel Certificate I I 1/ V 
Cc. September 28, 2007 Letter from Richard 1. 
\./ .. Armstrong to Paul Fife with September 27, 2007 V 
I Estoppel Certificate 
v DD. October 2. 2007 Letter from Jeff Needs to Paul 1/ V " Fife 
EE. October 2,2007 Email from Jeff Needs to Tom 
O'Shea re October 2, 2007 Letter 
1/ 
FF. October 3, 2007 Emails between Paul Fife and 
~ t/ Jeff Needs 
I GG. October 4, 2007 Email from Paul Fife to Jeff 
Needs 
HH. October 11: 2007 Emails between Jeff Needs and 
Paul Fife 
II. October 12.2007 Letter from Jeff Needs to Paul 
V V' 
Fife 
J1. October 1 2007 Email from Jeff Needs to Tom 
O'Shea with attachment of draft letter 
KK. October 16, 2007 Letter from Marc Weinpel to 
Richard Armstrong 
LL. October 17.2007 Lease Estoppel Certificate I 
MM. October J 8. 2007 Letter Agreement 
\ \ I 
1","}\ . October 19. 2007 Email between Jeff Needs and 
Thomas O'Shea 
00 \ November 7. 2007 Promissory Note \ \ 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF EXHIBITS-4 1465 
Defendants' Description Stip. Offered Admit 
Exhibit No. 
V 
pp November 26. 2007 Fax Cover Sheet and V 1./ 
r 
.... ~-, 
Attached "Updated CAM Charges" (:.) [1 "'\tv! L fe·- <S "j " •. ( 
QQ. January 25, 2008 Email from Jeff Needs to Paul 
Fife 
RR October 3,2008 Letter from Greg Crockett to 
i 
Richard Armstrong 
SS. October 6,2008 Lease Agreement between Tom 
O'Shea and the Family Care Center.. Inc. 
TT. Exclusive Leasing Listing Agreement NAI v-' V -- Commerce One 
ULT. Letters oflntent between 0) Shea and Family Care 
Center 
\l"\l, I Email from Michael Shiffman re tenant estoppel 
\ \ 
certificate 
V'-,TW. Amended and Restated Complaint and Request for 
Equitable Relief, Case Number CV -OS-J-14:23-NE 
XX. Complaint for Damages, Rescission, and 
Equitable Relief under FederaL Alabama, and l/ No 
California Law, Case Number 5: 09-cv-004 2l-CLS 
YY. Defendant San Francisco Residence Club, Inc.' s 
Answer to Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage, 
Filed on April L 2009; Counterclaim: Exhibit "I"; 
Exhibit "2": Demand for Jury Trial; Certificate of 
Service. Case Number 09-00191 JMS BMK 
ZZ. The Chil dren' s Center. Inc.' s List of Payments to 
High Mark Development LLC from September 
2005 to September 2007 
AAA. Confessiol1 or Judgmenr for $217.492.50 in 
Crestwood Enterprises, LLC v. The Children: s 
Center. Inc., Case No. 0001956-0C 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF EXHIBITS·S 1466 
Defendants' Description Stip. Offered Admit I 
Exhibit No. 
I 
BBB. Plaintiff Kate Larkin Donahue's Responses to 
Defendants High Mark Development, LLC's First 
Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Things, and Requests for 
Admission from all Plaintiffs 
CCc. Plaintiff John Kevin Donahue' s Responses to 
Defendants High Mark Development, LLC's First 
Set oflnterrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Things, and Requests for 
Admission from all Plaintiffs 
DDD. Plaintiff San Francisco Residence Club Inc.' s 
Responses to Defendants High Mark 
Development, LLC's First Set of Interrogatories, 
Requests for Production of Documents and 
Things, and Requests for Admission from all 
Plaintiffs 
EEE. Plaintiff Grandview Credit, LLC's Responses to 
Defendants High Mark Development, LLC's First 
Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production of 
Documents and Things, and Requests for 
Admission from all Plaintiffs 
FFF. Plaintiff Caleb Foote's Responses to Defendants 
High Mark Development, LLC's First Set of 
Interrogatories. Requests for Production of 
Documents and Things, and Requests for 
Admission from all Plaintiffs 
GGG. Plaintiff Thomas 0' Shea and Anne Donahue 
V O'Sheas' Responses to Defendants High Mark / V v Development LLC's First Set oflnterrogatories. 
Requests for Production of Documents and 
Things, and Requests for Admission from all 
Plaintiffs 
I 
HHH. I Deposition of Chris lohnson 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF EXHfBfTS-6 1467 
I Def~n~a~ts' Description Stip. Offered ' Admit I 
ExhibIt No. 
III, August 27,2007 Emails between Armstrong and 
I \VeinpeL bates-labeled RJAOO0147-48 I 
DJ Augus118, 2007 Emails beTween Armstrong and 
Weinpel, bates-labeled RJAOOO138-41 
KKK, September 1 L 2007 Emails between Armstrong 
and WeinpeL bates-labeled RJAOOO128 
LLL. September 20, 2007 Email from Armstrong to 
Weinpel, bates-labeled RJAOOOl15 
MMM, October 2007 Emails betlveen 14.l1nstrong and 
WeinpeL bates-labeled RJAOOO068-70 
/ l\TN1'-l. October 4,2007 Email from Armstrong to ,V'/ ~ 
-" Weinpel. bates-labeled RJAOOO089 
I 
000, October 16, 1007 Letter from Armstrong to 
I WeinpeL bates-labeled RJAOOOO85-RJAOOO087 , 
PPP. August 28,2007 Letter from Marc Weinpel to 
Richard Annstrong 




RRR. October 5,2007 OffIce Building Lease between 
V SCE Partners, LLC and Advanced Practice v . 
Management LLC 
SSS. February 7, 2008 corporate minutes of the / y Children's Center, Inc., bates-labeled CCOOO065- V 
CCOOO066 
TTT. December 12,2007 Letter from Pjchard 
Armstrong to Marc vVeinpel bates-labeled 




UUD, November 15,2007 Tenancy In Common I V V 
\ Agreement (O'SHEAOOO137-156) I 1 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF EXHIBITS-7 1468 
I Defendants' Description 
I 
Stip. Offered Admit 
1 Exhibit No. 
VVV. I Deposition of Caleb Foote I I I I 
"II \tVIJ/W. October 24, 2007 Email from Jeff Needs to / 
Thomas O'Shea and attachment V 




yyy, October 6, 2007 Email from .TeffNeeds to Michael I 
Garcia 
f ZZZ, September 14,2007 Email from Tom O'Shea to \ v V Mike Shiffman and Jeff Needs 
A/\_A.A, November 29,2007 Email from Leslie Price to 
Kris Burke 
BBBR September 28, 2007 Email from Tom O'Shea to v/ 
\ V 
-I lvfike Shiffman and Jeff Needs I 
I 
,,/ CCCe. September 17,2007 Email from Tom O'Shea to 
\ 
1/ Jeff Needs v 
I 
l/ DDDD, July 7,2008 Email from Brent Butikofer to Jeff /\ V v . Needs 
EEEE, Any exhibit listed by Plaintiffs. I .1. \ _. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24th day of February, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' THIRD AkJENDED LIST OF EXHIBITS was served 
by email to the following: 
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC 
Gregory L. Crockett 
Sean 1. Coletti 
428 Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-1219 
Marc J. "VI! einpel 
J 975 Martha Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
S:IVVPDATAIPLEADINGIHIGH MARK-O'SHEA. DEFENDANTS' THIRD AMENDED LIST OF EXHI8ITS.wpd 
DEFENDANTS LIST OF EXHIBITS-9 
1470 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DATED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 




HIGH MARK DEVELOPMENT, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; 
GORDON ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, LLC; 
BENJAMIN ARA VE, individually and as 
Member of High Mark Development, 
LLC, and JOHN DOES I-X, 
Defendant/Respondents. 
THOMAS O'SHEA and ANNE 
DONAHUE O'SHEA, Trustees of the 
Thomas and Anne O'Shea Trust u/d/t 
DA TED NOVEMVER 2, 1998; 
GRANDVIEW CREDIT, LLC, a 
California Limited Liability company; 
CALEB FOOTE, an individual, 
KATE LARKIN DONAHUE, an 
individual, JOHN KEVIN DONAHUE, 
an individual, and SAN FRANCISCO 
RESIDENCE CLUB, INC., a California 
Corporation: 
P laintiff/ Appe llants, 
vs. 















































Case No. CV-2008-4025 
Docket No.37869 
Case No. CV -2008-2628 
DALE A. SCHNEIDER, an individual; ) 
MATTHEW F. SMITH, an individual; THE ) 
CHILDREN'S CENTER, INC., an Idaho ) 
Corporation and THE IDAHO CHILDREN'S ) 
CENTER, INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of November, 2010, I served a copy of the Reporter's 
Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled 
cause upon the following attorneys: 
C. Timothy Hopkins, Esq. 
HOPKINS, RODEN, CROCKETT, 
HANSEN & HOOPES 
P.O. Box 51219 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1219 
Attorney for Appellant 
Richard J. Armstrong 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 
Attorney for Respondent 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed 
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 2 
1472 
RONALD LONGMORE 
Clerk of the District Comi 
By: 
